

FAROUK I UNIVERSITY
BULLETIN
OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS.



VOL. IV — 1948

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1948

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
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THE SARCOPHAGUS OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

This paper is the substance of a lecture delivered before the Faculty of Arts on March 27th. 1947. In preparing it for publication I have benefited much from comments and suggestions made by several friends, notably M. Drioton, Dr. Tarn, Professor Sidney Smith, and Mr. I.E.S. Edwards to whom my best thanks are due. I am also specially indebted to Mr. Alan Rowe who has generously communicated to me from time to time the progress of his important researches into the history and monuments of Pharaonic Rhakotis which will shortly be published in the *Annales du Service des Antiquités*. The present paper is to be regarded as an attempt to reconcile fact and tradition and is here published as a basis for discussion pending the discovery of further archaeological evidence.

Alexander the Great after the capture of Tyre is 332 B.C. and the submission of the rest of Phoenicia and of Cyprus marched on Egypt which was still held by a Persian satrap (1). It was essential for him to secure these countries before he marched eastwards against Darius and the heart of the Persian Empire, because Persia drew its naval strength from those seaboard countries and Alexander could not afford to leave behind him a hostile fleet which might cut his communications with Macedonia and Greece and make his position difficult. In Egypt too he was likely to be well received. Egypt had never submitted tamely to Persian domination and the history of Persian rule in Egypt is a history of revolts and of Persian reconquest. The Greeks in their immemorial feud against Persia had always been ready to lend aid to the Egyptians against their hereditary foes. The successful stand made by the two last native Egyptian dynasties, the xxixth and xxxth had been strongly supported by Greece. To assist Tachos of the latter dynasty Sparta had sent her aged king Agesilaus to command the land forces and from Athens had come Chabrias one of her best known admirals. It was barely more than nine years since in

341 B.C. Artaxerxes Ochus had succeeded in reducing Egypt once more. Alexander was thus hailed as a deliverer and the Persian garrison caught between his army and the Egyptians in constant unrest surrendered at discretion. Alexander as usual behaved in the most conciliatory manner. He worshipped the Egyptian gods who had been insulted by the Persians. At Memphis, where he paid due reverence to Apis who had been dishonoured by the Persians, he was probably proclaimed king. After descending the river towards Mareotis he paid his famous visit to the shrine and oracle of Ammon, as the Greeks called the Egyptian god Amen-Ra, at Siwah. His motives in doing so are obscure. Greeks, especially the Cyreneans, had long been accustomed to consult the oracle of Ammon and it is possible that Alexander having been hailed as King of Egypt and consequently like all kings of Egypt qualified as son of Amen-Ra (2) wished in order to calm possible Greek objections, to have his title confirmed by an oracle familiar to the Greeks and often consulted by them. Ammon recognised him as his son and thus the legitimacy of Alexander as King of Egypt was divinely acknowledged by a god worshipped both by Egyptians and by Greeks. On his return to Mareotis Alexander laid the foundations of his great new city, Alexandria, on the site of the ancient Pharaonic Rhakotis with its adjacent port Pharos. Like so many Hellenistic and later foundations Alexandria was not an entirely new city built on virgin soil, but an ancient city refounded, enlarged, and magnified, as Pagasae became Demetrias, as Cardia became Lysimacheia, and, best of all perhaps, as Byzantium became Constantinople.

Among the remains of Greek literature which have come down to us is a History of Romance of Alexander the Great (3). This in the form in which we have it is not older than the third century A.D., but most critics are of the opinion that the kernel of this Romance dates back to Ptolemaic times and is in the nature of a popular tale of Alexander's life and exploits composed in Egypt and based on historical facts. It is, we might say, the earliest historical novel. This is the Romance of Alexander which has spread all through the Orient and through Europe and has been translated into almost all the languages of those regions, including for instance Ethiopian and Armenian and it is known from the British Isles to the Malay Peninsula. The romance, which is usually well informed about Egyptian conditions, says that Rhakotis was an important town and the capital of a district which included sixteen towns. This is confirmed by Mr. Rowe's recent

researches into the monuments and history of Rhakotis which indicate that it was the key fort and town of the northwest frontier district towards Libya probably from xviiith dynasty times, certainly from the Ramessid age. The early harbour works observed by M. Jondet (4) off the northeast end of Pharos island are probably also Pharaonic and at any rate suggest that Rhakotis and its port were the main outlet for Egyptian communications with Mediterranean countries. It was perhaps the main port of Egypt for trading with Greek lands in the days of the xxvth, xxixth, and xxxth dynasties. The Samian (5) ship which relieved the Theraean colony about 640 B.C. on the island of Platea was on its way to Egypt and Pharos would be the first Egyptian port to be reached by a ship coasting along eastwards from Platea. Thucydides too knew of Pharos (6). A port in northwestern Egypt would be more suitable for communication with Greek lands than one near Pelusium or Damietta, for these latter were too near Palestine, Syria, and the power of Persia. All the evidence available indicates that Rhakotis was an important town under the later Pharaonic dynasties, and not a wretched village as Hogarth believed (7). The seat of the xxxth dynasty was Sebennytos, but in view of the close contact between the two last dynasties, the xxixth and xxxth, and Greece it is likely that Rhakotis was then almost as important as Sebennytos, for it would have been the port for external communication. These two dynasties depended so much on assistance from Greece. The importance of Rhakotis in late Pharaonic times is another reason in support of Alexander's choice of it as the site of his new city.

Nectanebo II (Nekht-har-heb) (8) the last king of the xxxth dynasty ruled well and successfully for eighteen years. He was also a great builder and restorer of monuments and temples. He apparently achieved a great reputation and was regarded as a magician by Greeks as well as by Egyptians, as is shewn by a Greek papyrus of the second century B.C. from Memphis (9). The Persians in 343-342 B.C. drove him from the Delta and from Memphis, but he succeeded in maintaining himself in Upper Egypt till 341 B.C. He may have made Assuan his capital, for his monuments are conspicuous both there and at the neighbouring Philae. After 341 B.C. he vanishes from history. One tale says he fled to Nubia where he died, but nothing is certain except that the time and place of his death and burial are unknown.

Alexander who like all Egyptian kings since Hatshepsut was qualified as son of Amen-Ra, called by the Greeks Ammon, as

already stated, wished himself to be regarded as the legitimate successor of Nectanebo II and the xxxth dynasty. Thus in the Romance we find two conflicting tales. One was that Alexander was the son of Nectanebo II who had taken refuge in Macedonia at the court of Philip II and had become the father of Alexander by visiting Olympias in the guise of Ammon which he had assumed by his magic. The other tale was that Nectanebo II though he had fled from Egypt would one day return rejuvenated and deliver his country from its Persian oppressors. Either of these tales would serve to justify Alexander's position as King of Egypt. He was given royal titles and cartouches like all Pharaohs, and the Ptolemies, who succeeded him, also had Egyptian royal titles and cartouches. The Ptolemies too we know were crowned kings of Egypt in the Egyptian fashion usually at Memphis, though we know that on one occasion, that of the coronation of Ptolemy XI, Auletes, the ceremony took place in 76 B.C. at Alexandria whither the high priest journeyed specially from Memphis (10). The Ptolemies completed or decorated many temples and monuments which had been begun by Nectanebo II especially in Upper Egypt, as at Karnak, Philae, Asswan, Edfu, Denderah, and Medamud. In doing so they definitely associated themselves with the last king of the xxxth dynasty. Their object was to conform to Egyptian opinion, custom, and religion and to consolidate their position as kings of Egypt. In this they undoubtedly followed Alexander's broadminded policy of conciliation.

Thus far we have two clear points :-

a) Nectanebo II (Nekht-har-heb) was far from being an unimportant king and it seems certain that he died outside Egypt, at all events outside Lower Egypt. As the last king of the last Pharaonic dynasty he was invested with a halo of romance which was enhanced by his reputation as a great magician in popular legend both among Egyptians and among Greeks.

b) Alexander, on being proclaimed King of Egypt and probably also crowned with due Egyptian rites at Memphis, naturally was acknowledged as the son of Amen-Ra and so was regarded as legitimate king of Egypt and successor of the xxxth dynasty and its last king Nectanebo II. Alexander and his Ptolemaic successors encouraged this by a studied policy of conciliation towards Egyptian religious belief and ceremonial (11).

There was in the Attarin Mosque in Alexandria a large (10 feet 3 1/2 long, 5 feet 3 3/4 wide, 3 feet 10 3/4 high) and fine sarcophagus of breccia which served as a water tank for the ablution

fountain. This was removed by Napoleon's expedition of 1798, (12) but subsequently captured by the British at the same time as the Rosetta Stone and taken to the British Museum as spoil of war (13). The hieroglyphic inscriptions on the sarcophagus, the lid of which is missing, could not then be read. Now that we can decipher the hieroglyphs we know that this sarcophagus was intended for Nectanebo II (Nekht-har-heb) (14). He can never have been buried in it, for he did not die in Egypt, at least not in Lower Egypt. Why then was his sarcophagus in Alexandria? Mr. Rowe's researches have emphasized the importance of Rhakotis in Pharaonic times. Though, as stated, Sebennytos was the capital of the xxxth dynasty, there is evidence that Rhakotis maintained its importance under this dynasty also as is shown by the monuments of this period found in and about Alexandria. Along these monuments there is in the Greco-Roman Museum the sarcophagus of a prominent general of xxxth dynasty date (15). This and other funerary monuments suggest that there may have been in or near Rhakotis a cemetery of this period in which important officials and nobles were buried. Perhaps there were royal tombs of the xxxth dynasty in the same cemetery. This would account for the presence of Nectanebo II's sarcophagus in Alexandria. As is well known an Egyptian king had his tomb and sarcophagus prepared during his life time. If this was done in the case of Nectanebo II and there was a royal cemetery of that date at Rhakotis not only would a tomb have been prepared for him, but a royal sarcophagus also. We do not know the burial place of the kings of the xxxth dynasty and it may be objected that if Sebennytos was their capital why should Rhakotis have been chosen as their burial place. On the other hand we must remember that before Professor Montet's discoveries no one would have ventured to predict that royal tombs of the xxist and xxIInd dynasties would be found at Tanis (16). It is therefore not impossible that Nectanebo II was arranging for a tomb and sarcophagus for himself at Rhakotis. The sarcophagus is so large that it is not likely to have been brought from a great distance on account of its size and weight. The builders of the Attarin Mosque would hardly have brought it to Alexandria from some other site in the Delta or Lower Egypt, and Middle and Upper Egypt are further away still. The Attarin Mosque was originally the Church of St. Athanasius (dedicated probably in the fourth century A.D.) till the Arab conquest in 641 A.D. when it was converted into a mosque. Its foundation inscriptions (17) state it was built in 1084 A.D. and thus the traditions connected with it probably go back at least

to that date. The tradition always connected with the sarcophagus of Nectanebo II which was in the mosque for so many years is that it was the sarcophagus of Alexander the Great. It was much venerated by all, Moslems and Christians alike, as the sarcophagus of the great conqueror. It was owing to this belief that the French and the British contended, so to speak, for possession of it. In those days the hieroglyphs could not be read and when the hieroglyphs were ultimately deciphered through the researches of Young and Champollion, it was believed that this was the sarcophagus of Nectanebo I, because it was then thought that Nekht-nebf was Nectanebo II. Now however, we know that Nekht-nebf was Nectanebo I and we realise that Nectanebo II (Nekht-har-heb) for whom the sarcophagus was destined could never have used it, the tradition attached to the sarcophagus assumes another aspect. Is it in fact possible that the tradition that this was really the sarcophagus of Alexander correct? It is possible that it is correct.

If the assumption is right that Nectanebo II was preparing in Rhakotis a royal tomb and a royal sarcophagus for himself there would then have been there on Alexander's coming to Egypt an unused royal tomb and an unused royal sarcophagus waiting for a royal tenant. So when Alexander's body was brought to Alexandria it is possible that the unused tomb and the unused sarcophagus of Nectanebo II were employed for his burial. The burial of Alexander in that tomb and in that sarcophagus would have linked him definitely to the xxxth dynasty. In Alexander's day and in Ptolemaic days the hieroglyphs could be read and if Alexander had been buried in Nectanebo II's tomb and sarcophagus the inscriptions would reveal that fact. Popular belief, as remarked above, recorded in the Romance held that Alexander was either Nectanebo II returned rejuvenated to deliver his country from the Persians or else the son of Nectanebo II. In either case Alexander's burial in Nectanebo II's sarcophagus would have been appropriate. The son would surely have a right to inherit his father's sarcophagus, if unused. This might have meant a change in the cartouches in the inscription and so far as we know no change is observable, but it is possible that the change might have been made only on the lid which is missing. On the other hand if Alexander were a rejuvenated Nectanebo II the sarcophagus would be undoubtedly his and no change in the cartouches would be necessary, although Alexander has his own cartouches.

When Alexander died he was wrapped in gold (presumably a golden anthropoid sarcophagus or mummy case) and brought by

Ptolemy I in a splendid funeral car to Egypt for burial (18). He was at first entombed at Memphis and later either the first or the second Ptolemy transferred the body to Alexandria where it was entombed in a suitable royal sepulchre. Is it possible that Alexander, and the Ptolemies after him, were buried in an old cemetery of the xxxth dynasty at Rhakotis? If that cemetery were a royal one then the mere fact that Alexander and the Ptolemies were buried in it would make the Macedonian kings still more Egyptian and emphasize their continuity with the Pharaohs. Would the Greeks have objected to the burial of Alexander in an Egyptian sarcophagus and in an Egyptian tomb? The Greeks and Macedonians had already been obliged to accept many of Alexander's ideas about the union of East and West in the adoption of Persian customs and in the marriage of Persian wives. Alexander encouraged too the theory of divine descent or even of actual divinity for kings and royalty. Greek heroic pedigrees however in many cases go back to divine ancestors. It is true that there were some who protested like Callisthenes, but in general apparently there was no violent opposition. We know too that the Ptolemies were crowned with Egyptian ceremonial, and appear in Egyptian guise on Egyptian monuments and statues and Greeks and Macedonians seem to have accepted this. The same would also probably hold true in the Seleucid kingdom which included Babylonia, another country with an immemorial religion and deep-rooted religious ceremonies and customs.

Ever since hieroglyphs have been read in the nineteenth century A.D. scholars have unanimously rejected the idea that this sarcophagus from the Attarin Mosque can ever have been Alexander's. This was partly due, no doubt, to the belief that Nekht-har-heb for whom it was made was Nectanebo I and not as we now know Nectanebo II. Since the tradition that it was Alexander's persisted all through the ages when hieroglyphs could not be read it is conceivably possible that the tradition is right.


The body of Alexander in its golden wrappings would probably have been laid in a coffin of gold and then placed in the stone sarcophagus of Nectanebo II. The inner gold coffin is reported to have been removed by Ptolemy IX, Alexander I, when in need of funds, and replaced by one of glass. Cleopatra is also said to have taken valuables from the tomb. In the tomb (19) were also some at least of Alexander's royal and military equipment, for Caligula removed the cuirass and we know that the sarcophagus and its contents could be inspected. Octavianus on his

arrival in Egypt in 30 B.C. according to Suetonius inspected the body of Alexander and in doing so, Dio Cassius says, broke the nose. It would seem then that the tomb and sarcophagus with the gold encased body of the great conqueror were always able to be seen by distinguished visitors. Perhaps the *procurator Neaspoleos et Mausolei Alexandriae* of whom we hear in two inscriptions was the custodian of Alexander's Tomb. Septimius Severus is said to have shut up all the sacred books of Egypt in the tomb and Caracalla laid in the tomb his cloak, his belt and other valuable objects. If the tomb were a rock cut royal tomb like other Egyptian royal tombs and if the breccia sarcophagus of Nectanebo II was the outer sarcophagus such visits would always have been possible.

We thus have two reasons for the burial of Alexander in Alexandria. The first is that it was his own city and the founder of a Greek city was usually when possible buried in its centre, as was Battus at Cyrene and Brasidas at Amphipolis. The second reason is that if he were buried in the sarcophagus of the last king of the xxxth dynasty in a royal tomb in the cemetery of that dynasty that mere fact would strengthen his claim and the claim of his Ptolemaic successors to be legitimate kings of Egypt and true heirs of the xxxth dynasty.

If the possibility of Alexander's burial in the sarcophagus of Nectanebo II can be provisionally accepted one further point arises. Did the legend of Alexander's connection with Nectanebo II, as told in the Romance, derive from his burial in the sarcophagus or did the burial in the sarcophagus take place because of the legend? Possibly the legend arose from Alexander's burial in the sarcophagus. The hieroglyphs could then be read and if the question were asked why Alexander was buried in the sarcophagus of Nectanebo II (Nekht-har-heb) the reply, following the popular belief already mentioned, would be either because he was Nectanebo rejuvenated and returned to Egypt as a triumphant deliverer of his country from the Persians or because he was the son of Nectanebo II. Either explanation would satisfy not too critical an enquirer.

If Alexander was buried in the sarcophagus of Nectanebo II in an old royal cemetery of the xxxth dynasty in Rhakotis where was the cemetery and where was the Tomb of Alexander? This problem remains for further research. The suggestion that Alexander's Tomb lay under Kom ed Dik is possible, but that hill



according to the latest excavations does not appear to possess a core of rock like the hill at the Serapeum (Pompey's Pillar and Kom esh Shuqafa). The greater part of the hill of Kom ed Dik is an accumulation of the Mameluke period being the débris from an active potters' and glassmakers' quarter. The Tomb of Alexander may have lain under the Mosque of Nebi Daniel at the western foot of Kom ed Dik which has attached to it the long tradition of the tomb of the mysterious Nebi Daniel. There is no reason however to connect Alexander with Nebi Daniel whoever he was. Perhaps the tomb may have lain under or near the Attarin Mosque which in its original form was constructed from the Church of St. Athanasius. On the other hand there is nothing in any legend other than the sarcophagus to connect either the Attarin Mosque or the Church of St Athanasius with Alexander.

Thus the position of Alexander's Tomb must remain an open question. On the other hand if this attempt to reconcile tradition with the facts we possess be accepted then we may believe that the sarcophagus of Nectanebo II once in the Attarin Mosque before its reconstruction where it was the object of the greatest veneration may be in spite of all scepticism the actual sarcophagus in which gold encased body of the great Macédonian conqueror was laid.

ALAN J. B. WACE

NOTES

(1) For the history of Alexander the Great see the appropriate chapters by Dr. Tarn in the *Cambridge Ancient History* Vol. VI.

(2) In their official titles Egyptian kings were sons of Ra only, but in their proclamations of their rights and claims to the throne they all, from Hatshepsut onwards, declared themselves to be sons of Amen-Ra and built birth chapels to support this. See also G. Maspero, *Comment Alexandre devient dieu en Egypte*.

(3) The best text of the *Historia Alexandri Magni* (Pseudo-Callisthenes) is that of W. Kroll, Berlin 1926. The latest account of the Romance is that of Professor Haight in *More Essays on Greek Romances*, New York 1945.

(4) See Jondet, *Les Ports submergés de l'ancienne île de Pharos* in *Mémoires présentés à l'Institut Egyptien* Vol. IX, Cairo 1916.

- (5) Herodotus, IV 152.
- (6) Thucydides, I 104.
- (7) Hogarth, *J.E.A.* 1915 (Vol. II), p. 55.
- (8) For the history of Nectanebo II see Drioton-Vandrier, *Peuples de l'orient méditerranéen* II, p. 583 ff.
- (9) See Wilcken, *Mélanges Nicole*, p. 579 ff.; *Id.*, *Urkunden d. Ptolemäerzeit*, p. 369 ff.; compare *Annales du Service des Antiquités* XL (1940), p. 13.
- (10) Bevan, *History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty*, p. 346 ff.
- (11) Bevan, *op. cit.*, p. 182 ff.
- (12) *Description de l'Égypte, Antiquités, Planches* Vol. V, 38, 39, 40
- (13) See Clarke, *Tomb of Alexander*, Cambridge 1805.
- (14) British Museum, *Guide to Egyptian Galleries (Sculpture)*, p. 248, No. 923, Pls. xxxii, xxxiii.
- (15) Greco-Roman Museum Alexandria, Room 9, No. 39 (440), see Daressy, *Annales du Service des Antiquités* V, p. 123, no. xxi. It is possible that there were royal tombs of the XXVIth Dynasty at Rhakotis, see Rowe, *Bull. Soc. Arch. Alex.* no. 36, p. 33 ff.
- (16) See Montet, *Tanis*.
- (17) *Corpus Inscript. Arabic.*, *Égypte* I, No. 518; *Bull. Inst. Egypt.* XXIV, p. 147 ff.
- (18) See Kurt Müller, *Der Leichenwagen Alexanders des Grossen*; Wilamowitz, *Jahrb. Deutsch. Arch. Inst.* 1905, p. 103 ff.; Bulle, *ibid.* 1906, p. 52 ff. The description is given by Diodorus, XVIII 26-28.
- (19) The references to the Tomb of Alexander are given by Calderini, *Dizionario Topografico Egitto Greco-Romano*, s.v. Ἀλεξάνδρεια, Σῶμα.

THE TEMPLE AND CULT OF APHRODITE AT PAPHOS

Of all the twelve Olympian gods and goddesses Aphrodite is probably the most sympathetic and most attractive, for she is the goddess of love and beauty and has been the source of inspiration to both poets and artists throughout the ages. Aphrodite, however, is not a native of Hellas, but, as we shall see, came most probably from Anatolia, where, however, she had other attributes.

According to legend, Aphrodite was born of the sea-foam off Paphos in the Greek Isle of Cyprus. Though this legend of the birth of Aphrodite is an exceedingly familiar one to us, there are not so many passages in the Classics which directly assert this fact. According to Tacitus (1), "the goddess herself was conceived of the sea and borne thither (Paphos)", and Lucian (2) and Pomponius Mela (3) mention the same thing. The name of Aphrodite, that is "foam-given", by which this goddess was known, when she came into Greek mythology, was certainly given to her in remembrance of this legend of her birth from the sea. In this connection, it is interesting to note that a feature of the shore in the neighbourhood of Paphos, is the extraordinary production of foam, due to a disintegration of animal and vegetable marine organisms, and there can be no doubt that this has a bearing on the myth of the birth of the Cyprian goddess from the sea (4).

The legends connected with Paphos are especially important, because of the world-wide fame of the Temple and cult of Aphro-

(1) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 3 *Fama recentior tradit, a Cinyra sacratum templum deamque ipsam conceptam mari huc adpulsam.*

(2) Lucian, *Phars.* VIII, 456:

Tunc Cilicum liquere solum, Cyproque citatas
Immisere rates, nullas cui praetulit aras
Undae diva memor Paphiae, si numina nasci
Credimus, aut quemquam fas est coepisse deorum.

(3) Pomponius Mela, II, 7 speaking of Paphos «et (quo primum ex mari Venerem egressam accolae affirmant) Palaepaphos».

(4) Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, vol. I, p. 13.

dite, and also because of the connection which they illustrate between Arcadia in Greece and Cyprus, in harmony with the undoubted connection between the dialects of the two lands. Three or more strains are to be distinguished in the legends of the origin of the cult of the Paphian goddess; and here it is necessary to mention that there are two Paphos: Old Paphos and New Paphos. The former is situated about seven and a half miles from the latter at a place now called Kouklia. In one of these legends, the foundation of the Temple of the goddess at Old Paphos is assigned to Agapenor, king of Tegea in Arcadia (1), who on his return from Troy, after the famous Trojan War, was diverted by a storm to Cyprus. According to Pausanias (2) and Strabo (3), this Agapenor was also the founder of New Paphos, thus supporting the Arcadian connection with Cyprus. According to another line of legends, the cult of Aphrodite was earlier than Agapenor's day. The priest-kings of Paphos traced their origin to Cinyras (4), the beautiful and wealthy king of Paphos, who lived to a fabulous age and whose grave was in the temple of Aphrodite, where also his successors were buried. One tradition made him the son of Amathusa (5), thus connecting him with another Cyprian seat of worship of Aphrodite, namely, that at Amathus, five miles east of the modern Lemesos (Limassol). As the acropolis and city itself of Amathus have not yet been excavated, we know nothing of the temple of Aphrodite there, beyond mention of it in an inscription found by the excavators of the cemeteries of Amathus. Cinyras himself is dated during the time of the Trojan War, for it was he, who, as the Iliad (6) tells us, sent to the famous Agamemnon a notable cuirass. There is also a story that he played the bad joke of promising the Greek king a contingent of fifty ships and then sending only one, with models of the others and of their crews in clay. (7) In return for which Agamemnon conquered Cyprus and drove Cinyras out of his kingdom.

The legends which associate Cinyras with Apollo probably do not belong to the most primitive stratum. According to these, Ci-

(1) Pausanias, VIII, 5, 2, καὶ Πάφου τε Ἀγαπήνωρ ἐγένετο οἰκιστὴς καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης κατεσκεύασατο ἐν Παλαιπάφῳ τὸ ἱερόν.

(2) Cf. preceding note.

(3) Strabo, *Geogr.* XIV, 6, εἰθ' ἡ Πάφος, κτίσμα Ἀγαπήνορος.

(4) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 3, Fama recentior tradit, a Cinyra sacratum templum.

(5) Cf. Sir George Hill, *op.cit.* p. 68.

(6) *Iliad*, XI, 20.

(7) Apollodorus, *Epitome*, III, 5 Sqq. (Loeb edition, vol. II, pp. 178-179).

nyras was a celebrated lute-player, who was defeated by Apollo in a musical contest, the penalty for defeat being death (1). Other legends claim Cinyras as Apollo's son (2). These Apolline legends may have been inspired by the Greeks to fit Cinyras into their genealogy — they may, however, belong to the Phoenician layer.

The body of tradition which attributed a Phoenician origin to the cult of Aphrodite, though it goes back to Herodotus (3), is part of the general tradition which assigned to the Phoenicians much greater influence in the origin of Greek culture than our knowledge of Mediterranean archaeology permits us to accept. We must, in fact, rule out all claims on behalf of a specifically oriental, *i.e.* Babylonian, Syrian or Phoenician, origin for the cult of Aphrodite, although parallel developments and later influence from such quarters may be freely admitted. Indeed, all the features of this cult can be paralleled in Anatolia or in the Aegean. It should be noted, moreover, that the earliest anthropomorphic representations of the Mother-Goddess in Cyprus are clothed; the nude goddess with whom Babylonian representations have made us familiar, is a comparative late development. In the same way, for the sacred doves (4) of the Paphian goddess we need not seek a parallel or origin in Phoenicia; their association in the Aegean with the Mother-Goddess and with a building of the same type as the Temple at Paphos is proved by the gold bracteates of Mycenae. Even for religious prostitution, such as prevailed at Paphos, we need not seek a Babylonian or Syrian origin, since we have examples from Asia Minor and at Corinth, Eryx and in Etruria, and this custom may have been of native growth. As regards religious prostitution at Paphos, legend has it that the three daughters of Cinyras were driven by the vengeful wrath of Aphrodite to give themselves to strangers, and ended their lives in Egypt (5). It has been suggested that they, perhaps like the Propoetides of Amathus may have also denied the divinity of Aphrodite and have suffered the same fate by way of punishment by the goddess (6). However, this religious prostitution may originally have had nothing to do

(1) *Schol. Hom. Iliad*, XI, 20.

(2) *Schol. Pindar, Pyth.*, II, 15.

(3) Herodotus I, 199.

(4) Martial VIII, 28 mentions «Paphiae columbae», and Athenaeus IX, 51 also speaks of the doves of Aphrodite's temple at Eryx. There is a dove on Paphian coins of the 4th Century. The dove-cult in Cyprus goes back to the Copper Age, cf. Sir George Hill, *op. cit.* p. 58.

(5) Apollodorus, *Biblioth.* III, 14,3.

(6) Ovid, *Met.* X, 221, 238 sqq.

with religion, but may have arisen out of the primitive fear of the risk run by a man who first had intercourse with a virgin, instances of which in African tribes are given by Fraser in his *Golden Bough*. In any case, the form which seems to have been practised at Paphos was not a continual service as at Eryx and at Corinth, but that all women before marriage were obliged to sacrifice their virginity to a stranger.

At the annual festival of Aphrodite, pilgrims walked by road from New Paphos to Old Paphos, a distance of sixty stadia (1), about seven and a half miles, passing through the sacred garden of Aphrodite, a name still preserved in the village of Yeroskipou (ἱερὸς κήπος) that is to say, "sacred garden". At the mystery performed at the Temple, the initiates received a lump of salt and a phallus, which they acknowledged by payment of a coin to the goddess (2). These symbols doubtless referred to the legend of the birth of Aphrodite from the sea.

The most curious feature of the cult of Aphrodite at Paphos was the aniconic representation of the godhead, *i.e.* the conical or meta-shaped object which stood for Aphrodite, which we see represented in the reproduction of the Temple on ancient coins and gems. The cone of Paphos, however, belongs to a class of primitive "symbols" which were widely distributed over Anatolia, and probably also over the Aegean and its western shores, and it is unnecessary to look for its origin in Phoenicia. Another of these symbols is the pillar which seems to have been more favoured in Crete, though there is no lack of evidence for sacred cones or omphaloi. In Greece, in historical times, such old symbols had been replaced or doubled, at least in important sanctuaries, by statues. At Delphi, however, the omphalos remained as a record of the primitive fashion. In Cyprus the use of such primitive

(1) Strabo, *Geogr.*, XIV, 6,3: διέχει δὲ (ἡ Πάφος) πεζῇ σταδίου ἐξήκοντα τῆς Παλαιάφου καὶ πανηγυρίζουσι διὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ ταύτης κατ' ἔτος ἐπὶ τὴν Παλαιάφον ἄνδρες ὁμοῦ γυναῖκες ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων συνιόντες.

(2) Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, I, pp. 12-13 (ed. Potter). ὡς ἀσελγῶν ὑμῖν μορίων ἄξιος Ἀφροδίτῃ γίνεται καρπὸς ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς. ταύτης τῆς πελαγίας ἡδονῆς, τεκμήριον τῆς γονῆς, ἁλῶν χόνδρος καὶ φαλλὸς τοῖς μουσμένοις τὴν τέχνην τὴν μοιχικὴν ἐπιδίδοται, νόμισμα δὲ εἰσφέρουσιν αὐτῇ οἱ μουσμένοι, ὡς ἐταῖρα ἐρασταί.

Arnobius, *Adv. Gentes*, V, in quibus sumentes ea certas stipes inferunt ut meretrici, et referunt phallos propitii numinis signa donatos. Julius Firmicus Maternus, *De Errone Profanarum Religionum*, c. 10, Statuisse etiam ut quicumque initiari vellet, secreto Veneris sibi tradito, assem in manum mercedis nomine Deae daret Bene amator Cinyras meretricis legibus servit, consecratae Veneri a sacerdotibus suis stipem dari jussit, ut scorto.

symbols was probably widely distributed, for, besides the chief cone of Paphos, smaller cones were found by the excavators in the surroundings of the Temple.

We now come to the Temple of Aphrodite itself, and at the outset it is necessary to state that at Paphos we depend almost entirely on literary evidence for the nature and history of the cult of Aphrodite, for the archaeological evidence is provided by one object only, which may be of primitive date, *i.e.* the aniconic symbol to which reference will be made again, and by coins and gems of the historical period, since the actual shrine has not yet been found. The site cleared by the British School of Archaeology at Athens in 1887, and supposed by them to be that of a temple on a Phoenician plan, is somewhere in the temenos of the real temple, and there is nothing Phoenician about it. That the real Temple of Aphrodite at Paphos still remains to be found and excavated may, however, be just as well, since the old excavators certainly did not possess the modern technique of excavation, and when work is again resumed on the site, we may expect far more satisfactory results than could have been obtained in 1887. Excavation of the actual site of the temple must therefore be awaited, before a definite reconstruction of the Paphian shrine can be attempted. But so much as follows seems to be probable, on the evidence of coins and engraved gems.

The Temple lay-out consisted of a central shrine, containing the conical stone, with two wings, *i.e.* the tripartite liwan-type of building. Such a type of building consists of a middle room opening on a court, with a smaller room on each side of it — a type of building which is also found especially in Anatolia, and this type of building was also used by the Cyprians, both in sacred and secular building, from the Bronze Age down to Roman times. Such a type of building is also represented by the 5th Century palace at Vouni in Cyprus.

In each of the two wings there was a column, the object which surmounted them is uncertain, perhaps merely a capital, or a lamp or a dove. On the roof of each wing there is a bird, no doubt a sculptured dove. The central portion of the shrine had an upper story, perhaps with windows, and the antae were terminated with what appear to be horns of consecration. The cone itself (1) was

(1) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 3, Simulacrum deae non effigiē humana, continuus orbis latiore initio tenuem in ambitum metae modo exsurgens, set ratio in obscuro. Servius, *Ad Aen.* I, 724, Apud Cyprios Venus in modum umbilici — vel, ut quidam volunt, metae — colitur.

surmounted by a double flat cap. The large stone, now in the Museum at Leukosia (Nicosia), which was long *in situ* to the north west of the site, has been thought to be the original sacred cone. However, the only ancient author, who gives a description of the stone, Maximus of Tyre (1), says that it was a white pyramid of unidentified stone. The colour of the small cones that have been discovered is indeed white, and they are of limestone or marble, and this would suggest that Maximus of Tyre was right about the colour of the great cone. At the same time, however, it eliminates the cone preserved in the Museum at Leukosia, which is black. In front of the shrine was a paved courtyard with a lattice fence, to which a gate with two wings gave access. This courtyard was semicircular. The details of the objects in this courtyard are too obscure on the coins to allow of identification, but one would expect an altar.

With regard to the altars of the Temple, we have several references :- thus, in the *Odyssey* we read "But laughter-loving Aphrodite went to Cyprus, to Paphos, where is her precinct and fragrant altars" (2). Eustathius commenting on this passage, says that the Paphian altar was ὑπαίθριος. "in the open air" (3), and it is known that the altar of Aphrodite at Eryx was also in the open (4). According to Pliny (5) and Tacitus (6), rain never fell on the altar of Aphrodite at Paphos. Furthermore, according to Tacitus (7) no blood was shed on the altar which was reserved for the burning of incense (8). The name of the altar according to

(1) Maximus Tyrius, *Dissert. VIII*, τὸ δὲ ἄγαλμα οὐκ ἂν εἰκάσαις ἄλλῳ τῷ ἢ πυραμίδι λευκῇ, ἣ δὲ ὕλη ἀγνοεῖται.

(2) Homer, *Od. VIII*, 362: 'Ἡ δ' ἄρα Κύπρον ἱκάνε φιλομειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη.

Ἐς Πάφου ἔνθα δὲ οἱ τέμενος βωμὸς τε θυεῖς.

(3) Eustathius, *Od. VIII*, 362.

(4) Cf. Tümpel, *R.E. I*, p. 677. Since the position of a Greek altar was invariably in front of the temple, the use of the term ὑπαίθριος for the altar of the Temple of Aphrodite on which incense alone was offered, rather suggests that incense-altars may normally have been inside the temple.

(5) Pliny, *N.H. II*, 210, Celebre fanum habet Veneris Paphos, in cuius quandam aram non impluit.

(6) Tacitus, *Hist. III*, nec ullis imbris quamquam in aperto madescent.

(7) Tacitus, *Hist. III*, Sanguinem arae obfundere vetitum: precibus et igne puro altaria adolentur.

(8) Virgil, *Aen. I*, 415:

.....ubi templum illi, centumque Sabaeo,
Ture calant arae, sertisque recentioribus halant.

Statius, *Theb. V*, 61, also mentions the "centum altaria" but this "centum" is probably poetical licence.

Hesychius was κίχητός, (1). Probably this restriction to bloodless sacrifices applied only to the chief altar of the goddess at Paphos, since we know from Tacitus (2) that animals, though only of the male sex, were offered in sacrifice. Kids, according to him, were especially valued for the purpose of divination. That small animals were slain in sacrifice, seems to find some support in a small altar-top, suitable for small victims, which was found by the British excavators in 1887. We know also that wild swine and probably tame pigs were sacrificed to Aphrodite (3). From the text of Johannes Lydes it appears that the priest, when sacrificing a pig, wore a fleece. As regards the subject of sacrifices, it should be noted that there was one which it was customary to offer to Aphrodite with the object of securing the fertility of the crops. This is recorded on an inscription found by the British excavators on the Temple site (4). The priest who presided over the sacrifices was called Ἡγήτωρ (5). Hesychius calls him Ἀγήτωρ and the sacrifice σάπιθος.

The immense importance of the cult of Aphrodite and the wealth of her Temple gave to the high-priest of the goddess at Paphos a position far beyond that involved in his merely religious functions; the priesthood became, in fact, a theocracy exerting its power over the whole island. When in 58 B.C. the Romans took away from Ptolemy, King of Cyprus, his kingdom, Cato offered him in exchange the highpriesthood of Paphos.

The king-priests of Paphos traced their origin to Cinyras whom we have already mentioned, but the service of the Temple was originally shared with priests of the family of the Tamiradae. These, however, were ultimately ousted from the Temple service by the priests of the family of the Cinyradae. It was agreed formally that the Cinyradae and the Tamiradae should preside over the Temple worship at Paphos, but, in the course of time, it was thought wrong that the *regium genus* should have no superior dignity to the foreign race, and the latter accordingly withdrew, or possibly was ousted from the practice of the art of divination which they themselves had introduced, and thereafter only the Cinyrad priests held office, such, at least, is the account given by

(1) Hesychius, κίχητός· εἰς δ' ἐμβάλλεται λιβανωτός.

(2) Tacitus, *Hist.* III, Hostiae, ut quisque vovet, sed mares deliguntur: certissima fides haedorum fibris.

(3) Antiphanes and Callimachus, in *Athenaeus*, III, 95f, 96a.

(4) This inscription is in honour of Nicocles (died 360 B.C.), cf *J.H.S.*, IX, p. 165.

(5) Cf. Inscription 105 in *J.H.S.*, IX, p. 250.

Tacitus (1). From the same author we learn that the art of divination from the entrails of kids which was practised by the Cinyradae, had been originally brought to Paphos by the Cilician Tamiras (2). Hesychius is the only other author who mentions the Tamiradae whom he terms certain priests in Cyprus: Ταμιραδαί· ἐρεῖς τινὲς ἐν Κύπρῳ. Of the Cinyradae he says that they were priests of Aphrodite: Κινυραδαί· ἱερεῖς Ἀφροδίτης.

In 15 B.C. a severe earthquake laid Paphos in ruins. Augustus, however, came to the rescue with a gift of money and decreed that the city should bear the name of Augusta (3). It is true that there is no proof that Old Paphos, and therefore the Temple of Aphrodite, is meant in the statement of this earthquake made by Dio Cassius and Seneca, — a simple reference to Paphos usually means New Paphos — but, on the other hand, the Roman work of restoration brought to light by the excavators, and to which we shall have occasion to refer again later, is a proof that considerable rebuilding of the Temple was necessitated at this period.

When Titus visited the shrine, on his way to Syria in 69 A.D., he enquired of the goddess first concerning his voyage by sea, and then in ambiguous phrases, *per ambages*, about his own destinies — sacrificing at the same time a large number of victims. This is according to Tacitus (4). Suetonius also mentions this incident and says that Titus consulted the oracle of Aphrodite at Paphos (5), but by the term "oraculum" we must understand "extispicium" i.e. the divination as practised by the Cinyradae, and not a real oracle.

What seems to be a last reference to the priesthood of the Temple of Aphrodite at Paphos, occurs in the *Acta Barnabae*, a 4th or 5th Century Cypriot work recording the deeds of the Apostle

(1) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 3, atque ita pactum, ut familiae utriusque posterī caerimoniis praesiderent. Mox, ne honore nullo regium genus peregrinam stirpem antecelleret, ipsa quam intulerant scientia hospites cessere: tantum Cinyrades sacerdos consulitur.

(2) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 3, set scientiam artemque haruspicium accitam et Cilicem Tamiram intulisse.

(3) Dio Cassius, LIV, 23, Παφίῳις σεισμῳ πονήσαι καὶ χρήματα ἐχαρίσατο καὶ πόλιν Αὐγουσταν καλεῖν κατὰ δόγμα ἐπέτεψε. Seneca, *Nat. Qu.* VI, 26, Sic Paphos non semel corrui.

(4) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 4, de navigatione primum consulit: postquamde se per ambages interrogat caesis compluribus hostiis.

(5) Suetonius, *Tit.* 5, aditoque Paphiae Veneris oraculo, dum de navigatione consulit, etiam de imperii spe confirmatus est.

Barnabas. According to this, the Apostle Barnabas in his travels through the island of Cyprus, came to Old Paphos, where "we found Rhodôn, a minister (ιερόδουλος) who, having believed, also followed us" (1).

Although the aniconic symbol to which we have already referred was the main representation of the goddess Aphrodite at Paphos, statues and statuettes of her and possibly of Eros, also existed, since fragments of these were found by the British excavators. Such statuettes, it seems, were sold to worshippers at the Paphian shrine, and in connection with this there is a charming little story told by Polycharmus of Naucratis, the Greek settlement established in Egypt in the reign of Amasis, about a fellow townsman of his, Herostratus. This latter, a much travelled merchant, visited Paphos and bought a statuette of Aphrodite, a span high, and of an archaic style of art. He was carrying it home, when his ship was caught in a storm. In their distress the passengers addressed their prayers to the image of the goddess. Immediately, the ship was filled with green myrtle boughs and a sweet savour. When it came safely to land, Herostratus lost no time in offering sacrifice to Aphrodite and in dedicating the figure in her temple (2). The details are particularly interesting, as parallels can also be found in Christian miracles. The date of this incident was roughly 688 to 685 B.C.

A gymnasium was attached to the Temple, as we learn from an inscription found there recording the names of subscribers to the Ἐλαιοχρίστιον, the place where the athletes oiled themselves (3). The Temple of Aphrodite at Paphos, as well as that at Amathus possessed the right of asylum, which was established by the Roman Senate in 22 A.D. (4).

At some time between 21 and 12 B.C., possibly in 15 B.C., a calendar was introduced in which the names of the months referred to Rome, and more particularly to the Julian family. Aphrodite opens the year, not merely as the Paphian goddess, but as ancestress of the Julian family. This month which correspond-

(1) Tischendorf, *Act. Apost.*, p. 70, κατηντήσαμεν ἐν παλαιᾷ Πάφῳ, κάκει ἤψαμεν Ῥόδωνα ἱερόδουλον ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς πιστεύσας συνηκολούθησεν ἡμῖν.

(2) *Athenaeus*, XV, 10, p. 675f : προσσχὼν ὅποτε καὶ Πάφῳ τῆς Κύπρου, ἀγαλμάτιον Ἀφροδίτης σπιθαμιαῖον ἀρχαῖον τῇ τέχνῃ ὠνησάμενος.

(3) Cf. *J.H.S.*, IX, p. 188 and 231 and Sir George Hill, *op.cit.* vol. I, p. 62, note 3.

(4) Tacitus, *Ann.* III, 62-63.

ed to May, was called Aphrodisios. However, by the year 2 B.C. this calendar had to be revised on account of Julia disgracing her name, Tiberius being sent into exile, and other members of the Julian family being dead. The new months more definitely referred to Augustus himself. The month Aphrodisios still opens the year, but the opening date is changed to September the 23rd, the birthday of Augustus.

As regards the epithets of Aphrodite, *Aëria* and *Urania*, these may possibly be connected with the fact that her altar was in the open air (1), on the other hand, in Cyprian inscriptions Aphrodite is always called *Anassa*, i.e. the lady or goddess, but in late inscriptions she bears simply the title "Paphia".

Two late authorities, namely the Pseudo-Clements Romanos (2) and the author of the Vita of St. Spyridon (3) state that the tomb of Aphrodite was shewn at Paphos.

In the 4th Century a disastrous series of earthquakes knocked Paphos about very badly, and this together with the Edict of the Emperor Theodosius in 382 A.D. issued against the Pagans, gave the death blow to the Temple of Aphrodite.

We now come to a study of the results of the excavations made on the site of the Temple of Aphrodite by the British School of Archaeology at Athens in 1887 (4). As has been already stated the actual shrine was not found, and it is hoped that it may be brought to light, when excavations are resumed on the site.

The parts of the Temple of Aphrodite at Old Paphos actually excavated may be divided into two sections. The First Section consists of a great quadrilateral enclosure whose sides are about 210 ft. long. This enclosure is flanked on the north by a wide stoa (5) extending along its whole width, and probably originally by a similar stoa extending along the south front. It seems that originally there was a range of buildings extending along the whole of the eastern side. Whether there was ever a wall extending along the western side of the enclosure, it is impossible to say, at present, since no traces of it were found *in situ* except at the west

(1) Tacitus, *Hist.* II, 3, Conditorem templi regem Aëriam vetus memoria, quidam ipsius deae nomen id perhibent. Pausanias I, 14,7: Πλησίον δὲ ἱερὸν ἔστιν Ἀφροδίτης Οὐρανίας.

(2) Pseudo-Clemens Romanus, *Hom.* V, 23, Ἀφροδίτης ἐν Κύπρῳ (θεωρεῖται τάφος).

(3) Vita S. Spyridonis (ed. Delehaye) in *Anal. Boll.* XXVI, p. 230, ἐνθα λέγει τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἐν Πάφῳ τῆς Κύπρου ταφῆναι.

(4) A full report of the excavations is given in the *J.H.S.*, Vol. IX.

(5) Stoa in the Plan is termed Portico.


end of the north and south stoas, but it seems probable that such a wall existed. The Second Section is situated south of the south stoa on the west side. It consists of the remains of a large open court with two irregular chambers and a double row of pier bases extending in a northerly direction.



View of the Temple of Aphrodite at Old Paphos

FIRST SECTION

In the great quadrangle the north wall of the north stoa from its junction with the west wall is tolerably perfect for a distance of over 40 ft., but is only one course high; it is similar, however, to the other early walls of the quadrangle. On this wall are a few very much broken blocks of an upper course still standing. Where this wall recommences, its character is very uncertain; its direction, however, points to its being an early wall. The eastern portion is undoubtedly Roman and extends nearly 60 ft. in an unbroken line. The south wall of this stoa is very fragmentary, and the west wall is very imperfect, though traceable throughout its length, but it is much narrower than the north or south walls. This stoa was paved with a coarse Roman mosaic formed of large tes-



Plan of the parts of the Temple of Aphrodite excavated 1887

serae and for the most part of plain white marble, but traces remain here and there of a coloured border. The alteration and repair of the north stoa seems to belong to the second great period of Roman restoration — the work is very hurried and irregular.

The south stoa and the central hall adjoining it form the chief part of the Roman work. These remains are not in any sense repairs or additions to existing work, but thorough and complete reconstructions, differently orientated from the earlier work of which remains exist on the same site. This stoa occupies a much larger area than any former one could have done, as it extends the whole length of the south front and includes in its area the space at the east end formerly occupied by various chambers. Down the centre of this stoa runs a series of roughly constructed piers on which stood columns of the Roman Doric order, and their position seems to indicate that this stoa was covered with a roof. To the south of this stoa exist the remains of a projecting portico, which we may assume formed its principal entrance; at the west end is a flight of steps leading from a lower level up to the ambulatory. A considerable portion of the mosaic pavement exists; this is of much finer work than that of the north stoa, the tesserae being smaller, with a very elaborate border in beautifully coloured natural marbles.

North of this stoa there is towards the west end the Great Court or Peristyle, and towards the east end there are two chambers (1), termed the Central and South Chamber. Of this peristyle only the rough lower bases of the columns exist — this is also of Roman work and, like the stoa, was of the Doric order, the bases being similar in all respects to those in the south stoa, and formed of small blocks roughly put together with hard white mortar. This hall had a range of nine columns along the north side, four each at the east and west ends — the south wall is part of the north wall of the stoa — and another range of nine columns extends down the centre. A roof, no doubt, covered this hall which must have been open on the north and west sides.

As regards the Central and South Chambers, these belong to one period, the last prior to the Roman work, and to the same period may be assigned the walls of the north stoa. The South Chamber is now very irregular in form owing to the alteration of the direction of the south wall by the Romans. The Central Chamber is the most perfect of all, the north and south walls being throughout of the same period and style of construction as the

(1) Chamber in the Plan is termed Room.

other early walls. Over the western portion a rough stone pavement set in mortar was found, but it cannot have been the original one, for underneath it were discovered certain earlier objects, *e.g.* a pin of bronze overlaid with a thin gold plate with an inscription written in letters of the Ptolemaic age.

Immediately north of this central chamber is what appears to be a great passage which has been termed the Great Entrance. It is of almost exactly the same dimensions as the central chamber itself. That this was always a passage is clear from the finish of the north and south walls which precludes any east or west wall. In the last two blocks at the west end of the south wall of this passage, occur at the bottom two small rectangular cavities into which bits of stone were let and fixed with mortar. From the depth of the sinking and the fact that there was some space behind the filling-in stones, it seems that these cavities had at one time some definite purpose.

The north wall of this entrance forms the south wall of a construction which from three parallel walls running in a northern direction, seems to point to the existence of two large rooms termed the North Chambers, of which the eastern one is the larger. None of these walls, however, exceed two courses in height, and in some places are of only a single course.

SECOND SECTION

In the south-west corner outside the south stoa we have a construction comprising a wing which consists of the remains of a large open court with two irregular chambers and a double row of pier bases extending in a northerly direction. The wall of this south wing extends for some 85 ft. in a nearly northerly direction and consists of a basement of polygonal blocks mostly of massive proportions on which rests a series of magnificent rectangular blocks of limestone, the largest of which measures 7 ft. by over 15 ft. About 50 ft. from the south-west corner two socket-holes for door-posts are cut in the basement stones, and two steps lead down from them: this is the only remains or distinct evidence of the position of a doorway on the whole site. These walls appear to have belonged to a large rectangular enclosure and to be the

earliest walls on the site, belonging to the first period of early work. There are no remains of any east wall to this enclosure. In the northern part of the south wing there is, between two rows of bases, a sinking cut in the rock 11 ft. 6 in. long, some 4 ft. 6 in. wide and about 2 ft. deep, in the bottom of which is a circular sinking 9 1/2 in. deep, and in the sides there are two grooves. Its exact purpose seems uncertain, but it may have formed part of a bath used for ceremonial purification.

It has been suggested that the Great Entrance on the east side of the Great Quadrangle, leading as it does directly into the Inner Court, was used for great processions or important occasions. It is, however, probable that the general body of worshippers would approach the Temple from the south — or sea-side, where the road of communication between the port of New Paphos and the districts along the sea coast runs. They would then enter by the portico already mentioned into the South Stoa from which a flight of steps probably led up to the Central Hall, and from this point there would be access to the Inner Court and various chambers.

Such then is a description of the excavations made at the Temple of Aphrodite, as they exist to-day. As they stand, it is practically impossible to identify from them any of the structures portrayed on contemporary coins and engraved gems, but as we have already stated, the shrine itself has not yet been found, and it is this shrine with its famous aniconic symbol of the goddess that appears on the coins and gems.

Though the Temple of the goddess Aphrodite has long vanished, her memory still lingers on among the population of Cyprus, and one can, even now, occasionally hear the expression *Panagia Aphroditissa* as an epithet now applied to the Panagia Theotokos.

O.H.E. Khs. Burmester.

1) DE QUELQUES PIÈCES NOIRES

Si *classique*, dans les écoles, a un sens favorable (mais qui décourage les enfants de lire nos grandes oeuvres), *moderne*, qui est employé dans la presse avec un sens parfois péjoratif, encourage les adultes à fréquenter certains de nos auteurs. Pourtant, le classicisme n'est pas une chose morte, c'est une littérature bien vivante, et sous tous les climats, et qu'il s'agit seulement de savoir découvrir et réveiller : la belle au bois dormant. Parmi les écrivains français d'aujourd'hui, il est en effet un certain nombre d'artistes que les petits enfants de l'an 2400 (s'il en est encore à cette époque) appelleront des écrivains *classiques*.

La critique de droite et de gauche continue, néanmoins, à accabler les lettres françaises contemporaines, et notamment ce qu'on appelle *misérabilisme*, romans noirs, ou pièces noires. Mais il est une façon de défendre les bonnes moeurs qui dégoûte de la morale. La critique peut toujours s'offrir un succès facile en présentant une oeuvre, si haute qu'en soit l'inspiration, de façon à prévenir l'esprit du bon public. C'est ainsi qu'en Alexandrie on a vu récemment quelqu'un s'en prendre au *Malentendu* de Camus, et, sous prétexte qu'il s'agit là d'une pièce ou une mère et sa fille assassinent (sans le savoir, d'ailleurs) un homme qui se trouvait être le fils de l'une et le frère de l'autre, accuser Albert Camus de se « délecter dans la pourriture », de faire un dangereux « étalage de criminalité ». Je cite textuellement. Tandis que les drames de Corneille, ceux de Racine, élevaient le coeur, nous voyons chez Camus « punie et non récompensée » la vertu d'un fils qui vient aider sa famille. Je voudrais savoir quelle oeuvre des « classiques » résisterait à une présentation faite selon les principes de ceux qui interprètent *Le Malentendu* avec ce peu de bonne foi. Tout le monde connaît ces deux vers de la *Négresse Blonde* :

*Dieu! soupire à part soi la plaintive Chimère,
Qu'il est joli garçon, l'assassin de papa!*

Voilà donc à quoi se ramènerait *le Cid*? Ainsi présentée, l'anecdote en effet n'est pas des plus morales ! « Qu'il est joli gar-

çon, l'assassin de papa», c'est bien le dernier mot de la pièce mais en d'autres termes, qui font la différence, car le grand théâtre, comme dit Louis Jouvet, c'est d'abord *un beau langage*. «Laisse faire le temps, ta valeur et ton roi». Nous savons que Chimène épousera bientôt l'assassin de son cher papa.

Et voici comment le même Fourest résume une autre pièce, du même Corneille :

*Et puis, voici Camille
(Seigneur, quelle famille)
Qui se met en fureur
Y a pas d'erreur.*

*Elle commence à braire,
Asticote son frère,
Et le frère en douceur
Occit la sœur.*

Elle commence à braire, dit Fourest. Ses braiements, nous les connaissons par cœur. Ce sont les imprécations de Camille :

*Rome, l'unique objet de mon ressentiment,
Rome, à qui vient ton bras d'immoler mon amant,
Rome, qui t'a vu naître et que ton cœur adore,
Rome, enfin, que je hais parce qu'elle t'honore.
Puissent tous ses voisins ensemble conjurés,
Saper ses fondements encore mal assurés.*

Imprécations qui s'achèvent lorsque le jeune Horace dégaîne et tue sa sœur :

*C'est trop, ma patience à la raison fait place,
Va dedans les enfers plaindre ton Curiace.*

Comme dit Fourest : «elle commence à braire et le frère en douceur occit la sœur».

Je ne pousserai pas plus loin ce petit jeu qu'il fallait pourtant mener jusqu'ici pour montrer à quel point il est injuste d'accuser un écrivain tel que Camus de se complaire à la saleté sous prétexte qu'il met en scène des meurtriers.

Qu'ont fait d'autre Shakespearé et Sophocle et Corneille ? Ah, bien sûr, quand on ignore tout de la littérature, qu'on en reste aux clichés appris, on peut conserver quelques illusions sur le moralisme bête des grands écrivains, qu'on oppose alors à l'immora-

lisme des écrivains contemporains. Mais voici quelqu'un qu'aucun bien-pensant ne suspecte (à tort d'ailleurs) de complaisance pour la littérature que l'on appelle selon les cas, ou *noire* ou *décadente*. Dans le *Père Goriot*, écrit François Mauriac (je cite la préface qu'il écrivit pour le livre de son fils Claude, *Aimer Balzac*), dans *Le Père Goriot*, le lecteur néophyte baigne dans un immoralisme à côté duquel celui qu'on reproche aux écrivains d'aujourd'hui relève de la Bibliothèque Rose. Ce n'est pas moi qui le dis, c'est M. François Mauriac, écrivain catholique, éditorialiste du *Figaro*, membre de l'Académie Française. Il serait évidemment absurde, pour défendre Camus, qu'on accuse injustement, de noircir à leur tour les écrivains français du XVII^e siècle. L'on pourrait même trouver des pièces, dont le sens général est moral, voire moralisant, et qui furent écrites par des écrivains que l'on nomme *classiques*. Ainsi *Bérénice*, où le devoir du politique l'emporte sur la passion de l'amour (mais on pourrait dire aussi bien que Titus était plus ambitieux encore qu'amoureux).

Quand on parle aujourd'hui des écrivains classiques pour les opposer aux écrivains contemporains, on oublie trop souvent que les classiques n'ont pas écrit les seuls morceaux choisis à l'usage des lycéens; ils ont écrit des pièces en cinq actes. Si nos critiques moralisants font la petite bouche devant le Créon d'Anouilh ou la Martha de Camus, qu'auraient-ils dit de Marcelle, l'ignoble et puissant personnage de *Théodore*, celle qui mène tout le jeu? Ambitieuse, menteuse, perfide et meurtrière, elle tue de sa main Théodore et Didyme, acculant ainsi au suicide son propre fils. Nombreuses sont les pièces de Corneille, à juste titre honoré en qualité de moraliste, qui seraient aujourd'hui, si seulement on les lisait, condamnées comme décadentes ou « existentialistes ». Témoins: *Rodogune*.

Voici comment, dans *Rodogune*, parle Cléopâtre, celle qui a déjà tué son mari, l'un de ses fils, et qui se prépare à empoisonner l'autre, Antiochus :

*Allons chercher le temps d'immoler mes victimes,
Et de me rendre heureuse à force de grands crimes.*

C'est le même personnage qui, quelques vers plus haut, a dit sans hésiter :

Sors de mon cœur, nature!

Pour parler le langage d'aujourd'hui, c'est le même personnage qui s'incite et s'excite à devenir une mère dénaturée. *Déna-*

turée, en effet et pourtant si *naturelle*, elle le sera jusqu'au bout, puisque, moribonde, elle trouve encore la force de maudire le fils qu'elle n'a pu assassiner :

Puisse le ciel tous deux vous prendre pour victime
s'écrie-t-elle,

Et laisser choir sur vous les peines de mes crimes.
Puissiez-vous ne trouver dedans votre union
Qu'horreurs, que jalousies et que confusions
Et, pour vous souhaiter tous les malheurs ensemble,
Puisse naître de vous un fils qui me ressemble!

Voilà comment Corneille ose faire parler une mère. J'entends bien qu'il est dans *Rodogune* des personnages vertueux. Il arrive même que par un étrange hasard, par un malentendu, dirai-je, le personnage vertueux, Antiochus, survit à la mère dénaturée. Mais dans *Le Malentendu* n'y a-t-il pas des personnages vertueux? Le fils, par exemple et la femme de ce fils, celle qui aime si simplement, si purement. Nos petites zoïles ne veulent pas voir l'évidence. Il leur faut toujours opposer la sagesse des anciens à la corruption des modernes. Seulement, ceux qu'aujourd'hui nous appelons *les anciens* étaient en leur temps ceux qu'aujourd'hui nous appellerions des modernes. A ce titre, on les opposait toujours, eux aussi, aux vertueux anciens, à Eschyle, à Sophocle, voire à Sénèque le Tragique.

Dans l'examen d'Attila, Corneille avoue qu'il n'a fait cette pièce que pour répondre «par occasion aux invectives qu'on a publiées depuis peu contre la comédie» (c'est-à-dire contre ce que nous appelons, nous autres, la tragédie). Plus précisément : irrité des mauvaises querelles qu'on cherchait alors à la grandeur qu'il sentait être la sienne, Corneille, dans le même examen, affirme avec sérénité qu'«on peut innocemment mettre sur la scène des filles engrossées par leurs amants et des marchands d'esclaves à prostituer».

Il se peut que de tels morceaux doivent disparaître des Corneille destinés aux héritiers de la bonne bourgeoisie. Mais enfin, nous savons, nous, que ces textes existent. Et peut-être même savons-nous que le théâtre classique est souvent à *devenir fou*. Voyez Oreste :

Mais quelle épaisse nuit tout à coup m'environne?
De quel côté sortir? D'où vient que je frissonne?

*Quelle horreur me saisit? Grâce au ciel j'entrevois!
Dieux! quels ruisseaux de sang coulent autour de moi!*

Je pourrais aussi bien me réclamer de Corneille. Dans une de ses comédies, dans *Mélite*, Eraste devient fou. Non, les grands écrivains classiques ne ressemblent jamais à Delly, ou à Max du Veuzit.

Ce sont des écrivains qui dans l'homme acceptent tout l'homme, et dans l'espèce humaine, tous les hommes. Comme nous, ils sont engagés dans un monde qui les blesse; comme nous ils sont engagés dans un monde où il faut prendre parti; comme nous, ils sont censurés. Lorsqu'au début pacifique du règne de Louis XIV Corneille écrit contre l'esprit de conquête (c'est la France qui parle) :

*A vaincre tant de fois mes forces s'affaiblissent.
L'état est florissant mais les peuples gémissent.
Leurs membres décharnés courbent sous mes hauts faits
Et la gloire du trône accable les sujets.*

on n'y trouve pas à redire. Voltaire pourtant remarquait qu'à la fin belliqueuse du règne de Louis XIV, quand cette pièce (*La Toison d'Or*) n'était plus jouée, les mêmes vers, à peine transposés dans le *Tiridate* de Campistron, furent interdits par la police. Non, les écrivains classiques ne sont pas de tout repos. Ce ne sont pas des écrivains soporifiques, ce ne sont pas des écrivains anesthésiants. Encore faut-il les lire. Ce qu'on se garde bien de faire, pour mieux condamner ceux qui, aujourd'hui, sont déjà les futurs classiques,



2) PHOTOGRAPHIE ET CLASSICISME

En considérant les photographies d'André Gide, qui annoncent (et peut-être résument) chacun des tomes de ses *Oeuvres Complètes*, comme si tout à coup l'évidence effaçait en moi les préjugés, je crois que j'ai compris Molière (et Corneille) un peu moins mal.

Les écrivains du XVI^e et du XVII^e siècles sont souvent pour

nous sans visage; s'ils nous en lèguent un, il se peut que ce soit un «portrait de Dorian Gray», à la surface duquel le peintre a voulu étaler la secrète alliance de son modèle avec l'humain: surnois, têtue, bête, proche de nous tous enfin, tel nous apparaît alors celui qui, le plus honnêtement du monde, nous entretient de ses urines, l'homme du *que sais-je?*, Montaigne l'intelligent. Si maintenant j'interroge Racine et sa perruque, c'est vainement que sur ce front serein, ces lignes harmonieuses, je cherche les perfidies qu'il faut concéder à ce poète suave.

Comme le portraitiste, pour accomplir une œuvre qui signifie, est contraint de condenser et concentrer (de figer aussi) en une image unique les instants divers de son modèle, n'obtenant ainsi — d'ordinaire — qu'une synthèse du banal, ou l'agrandissement d'un vice, d'une vertu, de même l'écrivain du XVII^eme, lorsqu'il construit «un caractère», ne prétend qu'à isoler, puis fixer, *un trait permanent du caractère* humain. Il ignorait le cinéma et que, pour révéler l'unité d'un vivant, ou ce qu'il a d'unique, cent images valent mieux qu'une.

Nous avons tous fouillé les albums de famille: bébé nu aux orteils crispés sur sa peau de mouton, écolier en sarrau noir, tout regard tendu vers le petit zoizeau, communiant plus bichonné que chien de luxe, hirsute foutebôleur faraud de ses genouillères, troufion soutaché, bariolé d'épaulettes, criminel aux yeux de Michel Strogoff, brûlés par l'éclairage de quelque Photomaton, comment récompenser mon père, ou moi? Et ce sylphe, pourtant, non: ce notaire, ce voyou, ce sportif, ce bellâtre, ce dadaïste, cet assassin, cet archevêque, c'est bien moi.

Nous savons aujourd'hui que nous avons plus d'un visage: qui n'a pas trois hommes en soi est un peu moins qu'une bête. Cet adolescent glabre, aux longs cheveux de romantique, comment oserait-il condamner tout romantisme? André Walter l'a pourtant fait. Quoi? que dites-vous? ce Christ espagnol à collier noir, lui Corydon? Oui, car *Numquid et tu* avait besoin de ce corp-là. Sinon celui du crayon de Bataille, si rêveusement ironique, quel Gide aurait écrit *Paludes*, ou *Prométhée*? Mais sans la netteté de ces dures mâchoires, que découpe encore l'ombre portée d'un casque colonial, nous n'aurions pas de Voyage au Congo. Jeune homme à la balustrade, puis savant lettré savamment adossé à sa bibliothèque, hier engoncé dans sa jaquette, son gilet, sa lavallière, ses faux-cols empesés, aujourd'hui chemise ouverte dans le vent, point d'yeux ici, tout yeux ailleurs, affecté, naturel, naturel jusqu'en l'affecté, affecté parfois dans l'excès de son naturel — et ces mains

que j'oubliais, plus secrètes (s'il se peut) que chacun des visages nus — tous ces traits, d'autres encore, s'enchevêtrent et s'épurent pour orner un André Gide. Je ne dis pas : André Gide.

Lui aura-t-on reproché ses visages? Il défait l'homme, paraît-il, le délite, le décompose, le pourrit. Lui a-t-on opposé l'Avare, le Misanthrope, le menteur? *Le Menteur* peut vous amuser; mais un vrai menteur dit souvent la vérité : presque toujours. Autrement, c'est un mythomane. L'unité de l'homme, certes je sais la voir, irrémédiable et parfaite : dans les asiles d'aliénés. On ne m'avait jamais dit que nos écrivains du « grand » siècle ont peint surtout des névrosés. Obsédés par leur vice, leur passion, leur vertu, l'Avare, Phèdre et Polyeucte appartiennent au psychiatre. C'est à qui fera le délire le plus systématique. Ah, s'ils étaient de tout repos, qu'ils nous ennuieraient tous nos grands écrivains ! Mais ce sont monstres de monstres, dompteurs de forsenés.

Il serait donc temps de comprendre que Marcel Proust et André Gide, quoi qu'ils laissent entendre, et malgré qu'ils en aient, sont plus *équilibrés* que Racine, ou Molière (lesquels toutefois restent *équilibrants* dans la mesure où nous voyons à quels malheurs sont pré-destinés leurs beaux monstres). Celui qui reconnaît l'ambivalence irrépressible des instincts et qui, récitant l'homme, v énumère plusieurs homme (homme singulier, dit-on; *homme-pluriel* conviendrait mieux), celui-là est plus près de la médecine, de la photographie, qu'Henri Bordeaux ou Paul Bourget. Or la morale se déduit de la médecine et de la photographie, ou du moins : des photographies. Oui, j'ai bien peur qu'avec son air d'immoraliste, et jusqu'en son acte gratuit, André Gide ne soit aujourd'hui un des rares hommes qui pensent *bien* : un authentique mal-pensant. (Toute morale future voudra légiférer pour tous ceux que nous recélons : elle sera gidienne en quelque sorte).

« *Le romantisme*, écrit Stendhal, est l'art de présenter aux peuples des œuvres littéraires qui, dans l'état actuel de leurs habitudes et de leurs croyances, sont susceptibles de leur donner le plus de plaisir possible; le *classicisme*, au contraire, leur présente la littérature qui donnait le plus grand plaisir possible à leurs arrière-grands-pères ». Il faut donc avouer que Gide est *romanticiste*. Mais à condition de lui donner, pour compagnons d'étiquette, Montaigne, Descartes et Molière. Aussi bien dirait-on *classique* celui qui vit avec son temps et, ce faisant, prépare l'avenir, *académique* étant celui là seul que Stendhal disait *classiciste*.

Querelle d'historiens, sans valeur pour nos lettres. Stendhal

combattait les classicistes; mais ses œuvres condamnaient les romantiques. Il est classique, au seul sens qui vaille du mot langagier. Quelque idée qu'il se fasse de l'homme (ou un multiple) ondoyant ou sclérosé, classique est celui qui accepte la rhétorique, la litote, et le cliché.

Christ espagnol, enfant prodigue et dieu Protée, Gide est classique.

ETIEMBLE

DEUX ENTRETIENS SUR L'EXISTENTIALISME

Ces deux causeries ont été faites sur l'initiative du Prof. Dr. AFIFI. Leur seul but était de présenter un aperçu de l'existentialisme en général et des critiques qui lui ont été adressées. En voici le sommaire.

JEAN GRENIER.

I.

LES THÈMES DE L'EXISTENTIALISME

1° *L'existence précède l'essence*, dans la réalité humaine qui est la seule que je connaisse du dedans. Dans le monde des choses l'essence précède l'existence : le menuisier imagine la table avant de la fabriquer, le géomètre conçoit la circonférence avant de la tracer. L'essence alors peut rester une simple aptitude à l'existence et être étudiée rationnellement. C'est elle qui intéressait les philosophes exclusivement, le passage de l'essence à l'existence étant considéré comme un accident et une dégradation.

Or l'existence est connue intérieurement et immédiatement, avant toute définition, et elle déborderait en tous cas une définition.

Des philosophes rationalistes, comme Socrate quand il était dans sa prison et Descartes quand il était dans son poêle, ont pourtant bien eu le sentiment d'abord de l'existence personnelle dans ce qu'elle a de singulier, mais ils l'ont ensuite rattachée à des essences.

Ils ont constitué une ontologie ou explication de l'être; les

existentialistes emploient une phénoménologie ou description de l'existence.

2° *Exister, c'est être un sujet.*

Il n'y a pas d'existence sans intériorité, — ni individualité. Ce qui est extérieur appartient à l'objet qui est en deçà de l'existence;

Ce qui est universel appartient au transcendant, qui est au-delà de l'existence.

L'objet peut être connu, mais sa connaissance ne nous apprend rien sur l'*Être*; il nous renseigne seulement sur l'*Avoir*. Avoir, c'est être ce qu'on n'est pas réellement (le monde des corps).

Une explication objective est à la fois inexacte et inutile.

Le transcendant est ce vers quoi est tendue l'existence.

L'existence a nécessairement pour but le transcendant, mais elle ne dure qu'à condition de n'être pas absorbée par lui.

Ce transcendant qui est un *projet*, est : la présence à soi, la présence à autrui, la présence au Sujet infini.

3° *Mon existence se révèle par l'angoisse.*

Alors que pour les philosophes rationalistes l'existence est d'abord un fait de connaissance, et se borne à la connaissance de soi en tant qu'être pensant.

Ici l'existence apparaît comme un mystère à percer plutôt que comme un problème à résoudre; le philosophe est acteur plus que spectateur.

L'angoisse est le vertige causé par le sentiment de *liberté* (qui a pris la place du cogito), c'est un «désir dirigé vers ce qu'on craint, une antipathie sympathique».

Elle est aussi la figuration de l'avenir et donne naissance à l'idée de *temps*, dont l'avenir est la forme primordiale.

Enfin elle révèle le néant à la conscience et lui découvre le caractère tragique de l'existence. L'angoisse découvre à l'homme son «*délaissement*»; il se voit seul en face de la mort à laquelle il est destiné, et, prenant conscience de son abandon, tombe dans le *désespoir*.

4° *L'existence des autres se révèle par le sentiment de transcendance* mais non par une connaissance objective : négation nécessaire et de double intériorité.

La phénoménologie existentialiste étudie les rapports du *Je* et du *Tu*.

Le *Il*, le *Cela* font partie des objets.

Elle montre les moyens de communication entre existants par la honte, la sympathie, le ressentiment, le mensonge, le regard, etc., sentiments qui ne s'expriment pas rationnellement.

L'existence dispersée devient banale (le «On»), concentrée devient singulière (le «Je»).

Il faut se choisir plus encore que se connaître. C'est pourquoi la liberté joue un rôle capital.

5° *L'existence trouve sa condition première et sa fin dernière dans la liberté.*

L'existence, d'abord, résulte dans la réalité humaine, d'un acte de liberté. *Esse sequitur Fieri*. Faire, et, en faisant, se faire. Il n'y a pas de nature originelle, mais une action originelle (qui peut être une faute).

A chaque instant l'homme se trouve dans une *situation* qui l'oblige à un *choix* défini; les *situations-limites* (ex, la perspective de mourir) renfoncent le sentiment de l'étroitesse et de la profondeur de l'existence. La situation rend nécessaire l'*engagement*. L'abstention est impossible : l'homme doit user nécessairement de sa liberté.

Enfin le monde des choses subit la trace de la transformation opérée par l'homme et devient l'œuvre de la liberté humaine. L'homme est ou une maladie de la nature par laquelle la nature se dépasse elle-même (en cas de négation de l'Etre transcendant) ou un être créé et créateur lui-même (en cas d'affirmation).

II.

EXAMEN DE L'EXISTENTIALISME

L'Existentialisme possède des caractères qui ont assuré son succès et attiré la critique. Ces caractères sont les mêmes dans les deux cas. Passons sur les moins importants. Par ex. La *nouveauté* a été à la fois objet de blâme et d'éloge pour l'Existentialisme, comme elle l'avait été pour Descartes, et aussi pour St Thomas d'Aquin. Toute doctrine nouvelle, quelque elle soit, doit combattre l'esprit de routine et se défendre de l'esprit de snobisme.

La «littérature» a repoussé et attiré chez les existentialistes. De brillantes analyses ont séduit les gens du monde et ont mis en garde les philosophes de profession. Mais quels sont les philosophes auxquels depuis Platon il ne serait pas possible de reprocher «la littérature»? Le dernier en date fut Bergson. Or la littérature étant l'expression particulière de l'existence il serait étonnant qu'on interdît à une théorie de l'existence d'y recourir. Ce qu'on pourrait plutôt leur reprocher, c'est de faire de la littérature pédantesque ou faisandée.

Voyons ce qui caractérise l'Existentialisme par rapport à d'autres doctrines contemporaines.

1° L'Existentialisme est orienté vers le *spiritualisme* par suite de ses origines religieuses (chez Kierkegaard) et du fait qu'il se pose des problèmes qui n'ont de sens que dans un monde où le sujet est soi. Ce caractère religieux se retrouve chez Gabriel Marcel, Léon Chestov, Nicolas Berdiaeff, Benjamin Fondane etc. et il est commun à des penseurs de religions différentes, qui tous éprouvent le besoin de poser comme existant le Dieu qui s'est défini lui-même ainsi à Abraham (Ego sum qui sum). L'Existentialisme prétend se passer de toute théologie et même de toute philosophie à ce point de vue. Il va directement à Dieu. Entre l'individu et l'Absolu, pas de moyen terme.

Or pour le Marxisme cette attitude est celle des premiers âges de l'humanité, lorsque celle-ci avait une «pensée magique». L'homme croit que les mots sont des choses dotées d'une sorte de pouvoir, et il s' imagine agir directement sur les choses elles-mêmes grâce à eux. A un stade ultérieur, l'homme arrive à la religion, c'est-à-dire qu'il fait un effort d'imagination pour se représenter l'histoire et la société; ce n'est pas encore le stade de la philosophie, mais c'en est une amorce. L'existentialiste, lui, n'est même pas arrivé au stade de l'imagination religieuse; il en est encore à celui de l'attitude magique. Dieu ne lui est qu'un instrument pour parvenir à ses fins (1).

Une vue aussi irrationaliste est condamnée par les incroyants,

(1) Ainsi pour Kierkegaard Dieu est avant tout l'Etre subjectif par excellence Celui qui commande à Abraham de sacrifier son fils sans raison, et qui sans raison aussi sauve cet Abraham; qui abandonne Job au Démon et qui lui rend la santé et ses biens aussitôt après; qui enfin, serait capable, s'il le voulait, de restituer Régine à Sören.

Ce monde là est celui de la *répétition*, c'est-à-dire du retour de l'individu, par opposition à celui de la *réminiscence* qui est la reviviscence du général, caractéristique du monde antique.

à qui elle paraît une folie (*credo quia absurdum*); et aussi par ceux des croyants, les catholiques, par ex., pour lesquels la foi, loin d'exclure la raison se greffe sur elle.

2° Tous les existentialistes ne sont pas croyants, loin de là, mais ils admettent tous la *primauté du subjectif*, et, par conséquent s'il faut les classer dans les cadres de l'ancienne métaphysique, ils seraient plutôt spiritualistes que matérialistes. Même si l'esprit, pour eux, est inséparable du corps et qu'il en partage le sort mortel, cet esprit n'en est pas moins l'organe de la révélation : c'est lui qui ressent l'angoisse, qui souffre du vertige de la liberté, car cette angoisse n'a rien de commun avec la peur vulgaire toujours causée par un objet, ce vertige n'a rien de commun avec le vertige causé par les troubles des canaux semi-circulaires.

L'Existentialisme est en somme un subjectivisme éperdu. Il ne peut donc agréer à une doctrine qui admet le primat de l'objet, qui fait dépendre la connaissance de sa condition extérieure et considère l'histoire comme mue par un processus économique. L'Existentialisme au contraire se place au cœur même du sujet, et c'est par irradiations successives qu'il retrouve l'objet, toujours pour lui moyen au service d'une fin. L'emploi récent des mots « factice » et « ustensile » pour désigner la part d'objectif et de tout fait le montre suffisamment.

Ce n'est pas que l'Existentialisme se présente comme un idéalisme, loin de là, puisqu'il ne part pas de la pensée comme fait primitif mais de la totalité du sujet angoissé et cherchant la libération; ce n'est pas non plus que le Marxisme se donne comme un matérialisme au sens ancien du mot, puisqu'il admette fort bien l'existence des faits de conscience à titre de phénomènes secondaires, et que le mot « matière » a fini par désigner quelque chose qui n'est pas tout-à-fait l'esprit, de même que le mot « esprit », quelque chose qui n'est pas tout à fait la matière.

Il n'empêche que l'orientation des deux doctrines soit absolument différente et que le malentendu à partir de la notion d'esprit et de matière réside plutôt dans la direction que l'on assigne à la vie humaine. Le marxisme reproche précisément à l'Existentialisme de donner une idée abstraite de l'existence, de parler de la vie sans penser aux conditions matérielles de la vie, de l'amour sans penser aux circonstances sociales de l'amour etc. bref de faire du sujet étudié ainsi isolément une abstraction. En effet il n'y a pas de sujet qui ne soit plongé dans un milieu social et naturel avec lequel il s'accorde ou entre en conflit.

En un certain sens l'Existentialisme serait plus proche du Christianisme. Pour ce dernier l'homme est une âme et un corps, mais plus encore une âme. Mais cette âme est créée par Dieu, elle désobéit chez le premier homme, elle est relevée grâce à l'Incarnation, bref elle a une histoire de même qu'elle a une société, par la communion, la réversibilité, etc. Elle n'est pas un sujet.

3° Ceci nous amène à un autre problème, celui de l'action. Pour le Marxisme l'action est commandée par les conditions sociales; pour l'Existentialisme, par la condition humaine. Ces deux théories ont ceci de commun qu'elles visent à l'action. Ce sont des pragmatismes. (Leur premier trait commun était de répudier la métaphysique, leur second de répudier le dualisme esprit-corps). Marx écrivait il y a cent ans que le problème n'était plus de savoir comment expliquer le monde, mais de savoir comment le changer. Malgré tout il s'appuyait, et ses disciples encore plus que lui, sur une interprétation de l'histoire (qui impliquait une grande confiance en la raison).

L'Existentialisme est anti-historique en ce sens qu'il est individualiste, qu'il nie la valeur de l'histoire, que ce qui l'intéresse ce n'est pas la réminiscence mais la répétition et le paradoxe. De plus la liberté pour l'Existentialisme est une sorte de création ex nihilo de l'homme par lui-même.

Or le Marxisme comme le Christianisme traditionnel admettra une détermination de la nature humaine (qu'elle soit créée par Dieu ou formée par l'histoire). Il ne pense pas que l'homme devienne uniquement ce qu'il se fait; ils prétendent que l'homme est aussi ce qu'il a été fait. Bref, en termes sartriens, il tient encore plus compte du factice que du transcendant. Au contraire c'est un trait assez commun aux existentialistes de mettre l'accent sur le transcendant.

Il y a dans l'Existentialisme une apothéose de la liberté qui pourrait, qui devrait se retrouver dans une doctrine révolutionnaire, mais qui ne s'y retrouve pas en fait. Le prolétaire en effet ne se révolte pas par suite d'une décision propre et autonome, en prenant la responsabilité entière de cette révolte; c'est le moment même de l'histoire économique qui l'y contraint. Il y a un déterminisme intégral. Pour l'existentialisme, non : l'ambiguïté persiste : le prolétaire se trouve placé en face de conditions de vie inacceptables d'un côté, de l'autre il choisit de se révolter. C'est dans la possibilité de ce choix que réside la grandeur de l'homme.

Donc voilà deux doctrines qui sont des appels à l'action; mais combien différentes ! Le Christianisme aussi est une doctrine

d'action et de liberté; mais il suppose qu'il y a une nature humaine et que la liberté est greffée sur cette nature. De plus la grâce est nécessaire; elle joue le rôle de l'histoire dans le Marxisme plus tard. Il y a dans ces deux doctrines une *condition* et une *fin* de l'action libre, tandis que pour l'Existentialisme le factice n'existe qu'en vue du transcendant.

4° Finalement que l'on étudie dans l'Existentialisme Dieu, le moi ou l'action, en le confrontant avec le Marxisme et le Christianisme, on s'aperçoit que l'Existentialisme combat pour la foi, pour l'individu, pour la liberté — mais pour une foi sans révélation faite à une Eglise, pour un individu sans attachement à une société, pour une liberté sans un but défini.

Par son dégagement de la tradition, de l'histoire, du milieu l'Existentialisme est donc un subjectivisme. Mais il est encore plus un irrationnalisme. Car le subjectivisme peut se concilier avec le rationalisme, la croyance à l'âme avec la confiance en la raison. Voyez Descartes qui est si dégagé de la théologie et de la sociologie, qui n'est ni un scolastique ni un révolutionnaire et qui avec cela croit à une vérité indépendante du sujet.

Or la nouveauté importante introduite en philosophie par Kierkegaard c'est que non seulement il n'y a pas de vérité, sans un sujet qui la conçoive mais encore pas de vérité sans un sujet qui la crée. Les hommes qui pensent avaient toujours cru que leur pensée dépendait d'autre chose que d'eux-mêmes, y compris Kant qui constate l'existence de catégories mentales, d'impératif catégorique, de principes régulateurs etc. dont il légifère le fonctionnement. Qu'est-ce à dire sinon que pour la première fois le *Cogito* a cédé la place au *Volo*? L'Existentialisme est l'ennemi du rationalisme autant et plus que des philosophies de la tradition et de la révolution, avec qui il peut s'accorder en tant qu'elles formulent non des vérités mais des désirs.

Ce que je pense de l'Existentialisme?

Je l'approuve d'avoir dénoncé les soi-disant a priori dans lesquels notre existence est emprisonnée, d'avoir dégagé une vérité première qui est l'existence de ma propre réalité, d'avoir montré que les conditions de connaissance étaient secondaires par rapport aux raisons d'être, et qu'il n'y a pas de valeur sans évaluation, de vérité sans vérification.

Je lui reproche d'avoir cru qu'en dehors de la raison il pou-

vait y avoir un criterium possible en l'absence d'un Etre transcendant. La métaphysique reste nécessaire; la constatation ne doit pas se faire passer pour une explication - de placer en l'homme une confiance exagérée et de croire que les puissances obscures peuvent le conduire plus loin que ses puissances claires. L'irrationalisme (existentialiste) ne peut pas compenser l'échec du rationalisme.

Jean GRENIER

HISTORY AND THE HISTORIAN

A Public Lecture delivered in the Hall of the Faculty on Thursday, March 4, 1948, by Dr. JAMES J. AUCHMUTY, Member of the Royal Irish Academy and Fellow of the Royal Historical Society; Assistant Professor of Modern History at the Faculty.

In a recent issue of the *English Historical Review* a distinguished British historian, in a pleasantly favourable note on my recent biographical and critical essay on LECKY, greatest of Irish historians, so closely connected with my own university of Dublin, somewhat startled me with his comments on my attitude to history and historiography:—"From one side and another, over and over again the reader is sure to find himself in amicable disagreement with opinions implied or expressed in this book. One might conjecture that it would even take a considerable essay or a long debate going to the roots of historiography to decide whether the author is right in disparaging so completely... (a) paradoxical judgement of Acton..." I was the more surprised in that on the judgement referred to I had felt that today there could be no two opinions. Accordingly I was compelled, as every student of history must be compelled at some time or another, to examine the basic principles of historical study. A whole series of correlated and relevant questions had to be passed in review and an attempt made to come to some firm decision on an attitude towards the subject and towards historical research. Such an enquiry has not shaken my opinion on the particular point at issue and it is not my present intention to enter on any detailed defence but rather to outline the results of my personal investigation and then to discuss certain aspects of historiography which have only come to the fore with the present generation.

Man has always held the past in high esteem; otherwise the knowledge of his environment would be limited to the experience of his own generation, and each would have to start anew his voyage of discovery through the complexities of nature. Nothing

in this World can be known or understood intelligently without some ideas as to its origin. Even a new machine is but imperfectly explicable apart from its history. Since man is more important than the machine more time must be devoted to the study of man than to the study of the machine, but it is essential to recognize that the present is, in its entirety, the outcome of the past, and from that recognition should come a more lively and intelligent interest in the world around us. To many it seems clear that for thousands of years civilization has been persistently advancing along certain definite lines, though the rate of advance varies incessantly both from place to place and from time to time. Such an opinion disagrees with that of Fisher, who failed to find any constant rhythm in history but agrees with that of Toynbee who not only asserts a unity of history but argues that any theory of progress in cycles would be an everlasting cosmic joke. History, as we conceive it is the record of the orderly progress of all that makes up our environment; and it is not merely a study in causation or a branch of criticism but also a great time drama possessing all the qualities of a science and of an art. In so far as it is a systematized and organized body of knowledge it is a science and we are in full agreement with BURY that there is such a thing as a Science of History but the terms of his challenge were too extreme: "History is a Science; nothing less and nothing more." History "knowledge gained by a process of enquiry" must be fused into the form of art if it is to meet with any kind of acceptance. Even Bury admitted this in a different context: "History is, in the last resort, somebody's image of the past and the image is conditioned by the mind and experience of the person who forms it." The presentation of this image is an act of artistic creation and of literary composition. Historical narratives can never survive, except as a source of material for experts, unless they are works of art, and no historian has risen to true greatness who is not an artist as well as a scientist, who does not follow in the steps of Gibbon, Macaulay, Buckle or Froude.

It is only in modern times that generations have grown up willing on the one hand to spend whole life-times in the pursuit of historical knowledge or on the other prepared to devote large periods of leisure to the reading of other people's opinions on matters of historical importance. "The reading of Histories only for delight, talk and ostentation, is a prodigal consumption of precious time" wrote George Snell in 1649 only a few years after BACON had declared: "Histories make men wise"; but in our modern western world so many have their lives deadened by rou-

tine occupations that some turn to history as others to detective stories for a literature of escape and of imagination. Obviously it is not the prime function of the historian or of the university school of history to provide a literature of escape but we do not sneer at gas the bye-product of coal so long as our supply of coal is not interfered with. So long as historical novels and biographies turn the attention of some to the pursuit of historical truth so long do they have a value even in the circle of the expert. It is the general opinion that the novels of Sir Walter Scott gave a wholly new direction to English historiography, and they certainly inspired many to their first interest in a branch of learning deserving of study for its own sake which is also a kind of knowledge useful in daily life. Nevertheless for most of us gifted with a mind for historical enquiry the "temperate curiosity" recommended by Lord Bolingbroke remains sound advice: "Some (histories) are to be read, some are to be studied, and some may be neglected entirely not only without detriment, but with advantage. Some are the proper object of one man's curiosity, some of another's, and some of all men's; but all history is not an object of curiosity for any man. He who improperly, wantonly and absurdly makes it so indulges in a kind of canine appetite; the curiosity of the one like the hunger of the other devours ravenously and without distinction whatever falls in its way." It is not given to mankind to produce a Toynbee, any more than a Gibbon, in every generation, and increasing specialization makes it progressively more improbable.

"The end and scope of all history being to teach us by example of times past such wisdom as may guide our desires and actions" wrote Sir Walter Raleigh in his prison cell as he attempted a History of the World. He had but little improved on the great definition of Thucydides, hopefully propounded centuries before our era, "History is philosophy teaching by example." How much nobler is this outlook than that of Gibbon! "History is little more than the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind"; or of Oscar Wilde "That dreadful record of crime known as history". But both Gibbon and Wilde lived at a period when the study of history still meant the study of the distant past, and the notion of recent history as a school for statesmen or as supplying a general background of culture for the many had not yet arisen. History as a subject of other than dilettante research has but recently come to the fore. No one but the expert feels called upon to read much that was written more than two centuries ago, and the nineteenth century saw a complete transformation in the

purpose and outlook of influential historians. Historical enquiry must always be undertaken in accordance with the ideas and interests dominant at the moment of investigation and no historian can abstract himself from his environment. He must therefore strive to understand both his environment and himself, and this generally requires more than mere passive acquaintance. Professor Brogan has well said: "It is a man's right not as a Professor but as a citizen, to have views, to get them expressed as best he can and to convert his fellow-citizens, learned and unlearned, not merely to assent but to action. A Professor who is a socialist in his chair but never from a soap box is merely a more sophisticated form of an idiot." It is certainly no essential part of a teacher's duty to influence the pupils under his care by a one-sided presentation of the facts and he is an unworthy teacher who does not present as best he can the various sides of every question not merely because of one's duty in the pursuit of truth but also, at the lower level since in any democratic state all types and classes of political opinion may be represented among the pupils, and all are equally deserving of consideration. Still it is no accident that all the great historians before the present day were persons whose full-time activity was not devoted to the study and teaching of any kind of history. The "academic historian", the "professor of history" is a recent figure. The noble line which stems from the Greek writers Thucydides, Herodotus and Xenophon and ends in English with Gibbon and Macaulay, Buckle, Lecky, Acton and Froude is a line of great men who brought to their historical outlook the wisdom acquired in military, political or even commercial life. The precision and accuracy of modern research workers is superior to that of their predecessors but no one can claim for them the same breadth of learning and imaginative sweep. It is no historical accident that Gibbon's *Decline and Fall* appeared in the eighteenth century, or that the same epic story would today be comprised in a dozen or so special studies, each authoritative but few readable. Specialization is essential in face of the tremendous expansion of human knowledge but it exacts a heavy price in destroying the essential unity of the human mind.

"It is given only to God and to angels to be lookers on" wrote Francis Bacon, possessor of one of the most remarkable intellects in the whole of British history, essayist, scientist, historian but also statesman and Lord Chancellor. The Victorian liberal believed neutrality in thought to be possible and yet it was of those same liberal historians that Emerson, the American philosopher, could write: "the history of Rome and of Greece when written by their

scholars degenerated into English party pamphlets". We knowing more about the emotions and also about human failings realise that it is not. But the reader who fails to grasp a historian's bias is generally lacking in intelligence and even the lecturer will soon be queried by the variegated members of his class. The Whig school of historians have dominated English historiography not because they were always right but because they were always readable. And just as the reader must note the author's bias he must also examine closely his choice of subject. In modern western historical research as in modern western industry, Toynbee has pointed out that, the quantity and location of raw materials is threatening to govern the activities and lives of human beings; the potter is becoming the slave of his clay. To the preservative qualities of the Egyptian desert we owe our great knowledge of the Ancient Egyptian Empire, how little do we know of the Seleucid which was probably of equal importance!

Since every author is the child of his time all historical works have to be understood in their context and a dead author's context has to be discovered historically. From the informed writings of HERODOTUS, the father of history, THUCYDIDES and XENOPHON it is a sad declension to the chroniclers of mediaeval Europe whose pages are filled with facts, often fanciful, presented without any pretensions to literary charm, perhaps destined for edification rather than the service of truth. A new spirit is dawning in the thirteenth century when Mathew Paris could write: "The way of the historical writers is hard for if they tell the truth they provoke men and if they write what is false they offend God." In the history of European thought there have been few greater sensations than that caused during the renaissance when Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457) demonstrated the Donation of Constantine to be a clumsy forgery, made some five centuries later than its presumed date. In their context the original forgers had not felt themselves dishonest. They probably believed in their grant, they felt the proof would be useful. They can be compared with the English monk, who, on being asked to write the biography of the Patron Saint of a neighbouring foundation, asked for materials, and when told there were none replied: "So much the better! I shall prepare you a story after the manner of St. Thomas a Beckett". That monk felt no moral compunction. He was like a modern novelist writing for his public. This is a far cry from the notion, slowly gaining strength since the time of the Renaissance, that history should be studied for its own sake, for the mere purpose of getting

at the truth respecting the causes, the facts and the consequences of the great movements of the past.

In the medieval world it was an Arabic historian who set out the highest ideals of historical research; though like so many westerners of later date he proved a voice crying in the wilderness. The weakness of the great majority of Arab historians is the compilation of vast quantities of undigested material. Every source is tapped, every reference quoted, but too often there is neither synthesis nor evaluation. Their general inferiority to the best of the west is shown by the comparisons that are made. AT-TABARI who died in 923 was by Gibbon called the Arab Livy; AL-MASOUDI who died in 956 has been called the Herodotus of the Arabs; but IBN-KHALDUN (1332-1406) stands on his own feet incomparably alone, the greatest historian to write in Arabic at any period in the history of the language, with a scientific attitude far in advance of the western world of his day. In his Prologomena, which would be better called Introduction, to History, of which a good English translation is much to be desired, he sets out at length his principles of historical study and research. "...history includes reflection and examination and the subtle tracing of causes and origins. And it is worthy to be considered one of the sciences of wisdom." Ibn-Khaldun identified the Science of History with the Science of Civilisation — "a vast and infinite science in which all particular arts and sciences may be included." In history he recognized an endless cycle of progress and retrogression analogous to the phenomena of human life. Kingdoms are born, attain maturity and die, and, since he was chiefly thinking of the shifting kingdoms of the desert, their brief life he estimated at not more than three generations or 120 years, reminding the English-speaking of the Lancashire proverb about success in commerce: Clogs to clogs, three generations.

Ibn-Khaldun was very severe on the errors and the non-scientific attitude of his predecessors. Pointing out that even in the fourteenth century the historically minded public was growing he deprecated the over-emphasis on political history and recommended less genealogical and legal detail since others than ministers and members of ruling families were now prepared to read historical works. He enunciated seven causes of error in the writing of history:— i. Prejudice; ii. Undue confidence in authorities; iii. Ignorance of the aim of those who took part in historical events; iv. Readiness to believe that truth has already been obtained; v. Ignorance of the circumstances surrounding events;

vi. Desire to win the favour of great personages; vii. Ignorance of the nature of things from which civilization arises. Unfortunately Ibn-Khaldun is a great light shining in a sea of darkness. No other historian of comparable talents followed in his footsteps and he is a lone figure in the intellectual world of his day. He had a strangely chequered career, in turn civil-servant, diplomat, lawyer, judge, theologian — he was at all times a prolific writer — on philosophy, logic, arithmetic and law as well as history. Four times he was Secretary or Prime Minister to one of the petty Sultans of North Africa; three times he was dismissed or imprisoned. Three times he was Grand Cadi of the Malakite Rite at Cairo and twice dismissed. Yet in all his misadventures he was treated with the respect due to his remarkable learning even when captured by the great Tamurlane during the Sultan of Egypt's invasion of Syria in 1400. He certainly belongs to that noble line already referred to who brought to their historical outlook the wisdom acquired in military and political life.

Ibn-Khaldun left no school. He was a genius born out of due time, and Professor Flint can hardly be justified in calling him the founder of the Science of History. That Science is the child of the eighteenth century, for History as an exact science is a late invention. In the sense parallel to that in which Euclid, Aristotle and Archimedes were scientists the ancients had no historians. In the social sciences Aristotle, as a writer on Politics, is the first scientific thinker. As the Babylonians and the Egyptians seem to have collected observations and made measurements without really achieving a scientific outlook upon astronomy and mathematics, so Thucydides and Tacitus recorded with industry and imagination what they had seen and heard; but observation and measurement are not science, and memoirs and legends are only of the stuff of history. Observation and measurement become science when they are synthesised or generalized or when the notion of the concept emerges and this first happened with the Greeks. Memoir and legend become history when they are lifted out of the region of authority by the birth of historical criticism; and this is the discovery of our modern world, its contribution to the advancement of human knowledge. Critical history, foreshadowed by Ibn-Khaldun, began in the hands of men like Vico and Hume; Gibbon and Montesquieu; Niebuhr and Herder; and ripened into the nineteenth century when in the words of Collingwood: "history stood forth the unmistakable Queen of the Sciences and biologists like Darwin and Huxley, philosophers like Hegel, theologians like Baur and Newman, and economists like Marx ex-

PLICITLY resolved the problems of their special sciences into historical problems, and all the waters of religion and science went to swell the great river of historical thought. So gigantic has been the effect of this revolution that as yet people hardly appreciate it. They talk of evolution, of progress, of the metaphysical reality of time, as if those were notions of the first importance and grand discoveries of modern science. But they are the only half understood and mythological expressions of the concept of history''.

Throughout this paper you will note that the word *History* is being used in what the philosophers might call its common-sense meaning, and that, of course, is the way most of us personally use it. The word, however, possesses certain ambiguities. The majority use it improperly, as I have used it, to denote the actual course of events, whereas the true definition makes of history merely a mode of enquiry, or of learning by enquiry. I am not, however, approaching the subject as a philosopher, in the technical sense, and I merely want you to realize that if we refer to Alexander and to Mussolini as Makers of History we should, were we exact, be asserting that these leaders were distinguished writers of historical narratives. To call Julius Caesar a Maker of History would be, in every sense, correct. Accepting the common usage there is one further point which modern philosophers are always calling to our attention. What is the actual course of events we aim at describing? History is not a science of direct observation, or of experiment but of criticism. The object of the historian, according to such philosophers as Croce and Collingwood, is to relive the experiences of the past, to concern himself not so much with action which is the result of thought as with the act of thinking itself. As Collingwood has asserted:- "Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past, and at the same time it is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past acts in the present." In contradistinction to the Marxian interpretation of history the predominant western school of historiography stresses the domination of the human mind in its relation with the external world. Pressed to extremes the doctrine of the supremacy of thought over action can be nonsensical. Prior to the 1945 British general election someone invited G.M. Trevelyan, the most distinguished living British historian, to express a political forecast as to the result. He replied that he took no part in politics but that he hoped Mr. Churchill would be defeated because: "He is a great historian." This opinion can, of course, be looked at from several points of view. If Trevelyan meant that Churchill had reached an age when he must have leisure to continue the histo-

rical work which would give him one type of lasting fame he was giving a sound judgement. On the other hand Churchill's genius as a historian has been, in great measure, due to his participation in great events, and if therefore Trevelyan's remark was in any sense a criticism of the value of Churchill's eventful career it was, from my point of view, wrong. The dichotomy which these philosophical historians set up between thought and action seems to me too sharp, one is impossible without the other, the interpenetration is so close for me as to make them inseparable. I therefore query the extreme interpretation of COLLINGWOOD's line of argument that anybody can shape events only a great man can write about them. "There is no mode of action, no form of emotion, that we do not share with the lower animals. It is only in language that we rise above them, by language which is the parent and not the child of thought." Elsewhere he writes: "the cause (of a historical event) for (the historian) means the thought in the mind of the person by whose agency the event came about: and this is not something other than the event, it is the inside of the event... By an effort of active critical thinking the historian re-thinks these thoughts in his own mind. He constructs a picture which is partly a narrative of events, partly a description of situations, exhibition of motives, analysis of characters. He aims at making his picture a coherent whole, whose every character and every situation is so bound up with the rest that the character in this situation cannot but act in this way."

It is, of course, necessary that we should enquire at times into the validity of our modes of thought and experience but most of us will go on in the old way expressing perhaps the countryman's pleasure when he learned that he had been talking prose all his life. In any case in our generation philosophy has stepped down from its former pedestal on which it attempted to explain the universe and has now reduced itself to the much humbler task of analysing the structure within its reach. It has become concerned with the skeleton rather than with the spirit just when historical enquiry has widened its scope from a study of purely political history to a situation in which the sphere of history is as wide as the sphere of human interest.

We have come to realise that political history is but an infinitesimal portion of the great panorama which true history lays before us. In all ages and in all generations the life of the common man has pursued the even tenour of its way unheeding of and unhindered by the changes and chances of the political situation.

An over emphasis on political history, such as still obtains in France, is what this generation must attempt to avoid at the same time also escaping the error of falling into the other extreme and explaining all history in terms of economics. The historians to whom I am personally most attracted are those who associate historical progress with the evolution of human thought. They were dominant for a short period in the nineteenth century but they accomplished a lasting work among the most distinguished of our historians even if they had little effect on school text-books. In that century, for a moment in our intellectual history, great minds attempted not merely to synthesise knowledge but also to lay new foundations for our systems of thought. The vulgar notion of the English Victorian age as one of unqualified commercial expansion dominated by rigorous conceptions of middle-class morality is a democratic conception in the sense that it is obtained by the mere counting of heads, but it takes no account of the intellectual ferment going on in the educated classes of society as the result of the outpourings of scholars and scientists of very divergent opinions. The representative Victorian writers may have been coloured by the spirit of their age but they were setting light to revolutionary fires which undermined all prevailing systems of thought.

With the possible exceptions of G.M. Trevelyan or of Arnold Toynbee, no modern historian possesses or deserves, among the English-speaking public, that influence which was attained with such masterly success by Macaulay, Buckle, Carlyle, Lecky, Froude, to a lesser degree Acton, and by the Americans, Prescott, Motley and Lea. Not only did these men have something to say, but, in a manner different from the vast majority of historians, that had each a philosophy to express, and these philosophies deliberately sapped the foundations of much current belief. In effect these authors laid down the intellectual foundations of our time, and the varied attempts to overthrow their philosophic edifices have so far produced no critic of equal influence with the original writers. It is the modern fashion to sneer at Buckle and his vast design of a History of Civilization, of which he was only permitted to lay the groundwork, but much of our modern change of emphasis in historical research is either explicit or implicit in his work. Attention is turned from action to thought, from rulers to the common-people, from Acts of God to scientific phenomena. The present vogue, which he envisaged, is for a climatological approach to history. The influence of climate and the influence of disease are the two factors which have most usefully been brought to the

fore in recent years, and neither of them has any close affinity for that domination of thought over event which seems to be asserted by COLLINGWOOD.

We now see that progress and civilization are closely related to the distribution of disease. It is many centuries since the Latin poet HORACE asserted that all men could be wise save when they had a cold in the head. No great civilization has been established in those areas of the world where malaria is endemic or where the climate is well outside the optimum for human comfort. Two thousand years ago Aristotle, Hippocrates and Herodotus thought that the rise of Greece and the fate of the mighty empires of Asia Minor confirmed the excellence of the climate of Greece, yet, despite the influence of Montesquieu and of Buckle, it is only in this century that serious study of the effect of climate on history has been undertaken. The subject has been particularly brought to the attention of American scholars because of the effect on the way of life of a section of the American people of the denudation of some of the middle western states owing to excessive felling of forests and uneconomic usage of soil resources. In large areas of the United States and Canada human greed has produced a regression of civilization. It is obvious that what is going on under our own eyes today must have occurred frequently in history and we now realise that those invasions of Europe led by Alaric and Attila were not so much the result of inspiring leadership as of the necessity for following the line of least resistance. These barbarian tribes were forced out of Asia by the failure of their feeding grounds.

It is now realised that there has been a great recession of water in the Near East. The Syrian desert is covered with the ruins of mighty cities where today it is almost impossible to support human life, but how few of our historians explain military defeats or even the fall of mighty civilizations in terms of exhausted resources caused by events outside human control. Of course humanity can contribute to the physical causes of its own destruction. The American farmer in the middle west certainly has. When the Arabs conquered Alexandria it was the second city of the Roman empire with a population of over a million, with four thousand public baths and four thousand theatres; all through the Roman empire the Roman army spread the use of public warm water baths, the ruins of many of which we can still see, but the fall of the empire resulted in the destruction of the baths and, more seriously, the complete loss of the knowledge of how they were

heated. In 950 A.D. under the rule of Abd-el-Rahman ii the population of Spain was calculated at thirty million; in 1594 under Philip ii, at the beginning of what some call Spain's Golden Age it had dropped to a little over eight million as a result of incessant warfare, the expulsion of the Jews and the Moors, the influence of the Inquisition and emigration to America. Spain has never recovered from that blood-letting. In this Spanish case we have a collection of general causes only recognizable over centuries and so like climate and disease too often overlooked. They produced that exhausted type of Spanish intellect exemplified in the famous address of the university of Cervera — the only university in Catalonia — to Ferdinand VII: "Far be from us the dangerous novelty of thinking."

The leading climatological historian, Ellsworth Huntington, explains American predominance in the world today by reference to its optimum temperature for human life and work, and the prevalence in the northern United States of stormy conditions which he contends are provocative of human thought and energy. Like all pioneers his tendency is to claim too much but his contributions to historical thought are undoubtedly significant and it is essential today that historians should look at mankind as a whole since all present civilizations take most of their new characteristics from western Europe. As cities all over the world become increasingly alike so also do the lives of intelligent people. Save for its natural beauty the corniche of Alexandria might be the skyline of any American city. Politically Egypt has had few relations with the United States in the past and present contacts are very uneasy yet consider the profound influence exercised on Egyptian civilization by the cinema, the motor car, the aeroplane and so much else of largely American provenance. How many Arabic historians have measured or estimated these influences? So far agricultural workers are not equally standardized with those in towns but perhaps in a thousand years all humanity may have evolved to a standard type, though since change is at an uneven pace it is also possible that the divergencies may increase.

Huntington regards the march of civilization as a great tide which moves steadily forward in a wide flat wave. On the top of the wave one can recognize huge swells due to a storm far out at sea. These cause the water to rise and fall so much that the tide is not noticed till some time has elapsed. The swells correspond to the rise and fall of nations due to the broad interplay of biological inheritance, psychical environment and cultural endowment. The

small waves are due to local winds which represent wars, new treaties, parliamentary debates, the influence of great personalities or of outstanding books.

Thus Huntington, though stressing climatological factors, recognizes many others including that of personality which is so completely overlooked by the Marxian interpretation of history and to which even Buckle, in revolt against the dominant tendencies of his time, gave too little value. The Russian revolution would have been something very different without Lenin; its development would have been considerably altered had Trotsky been substituted for Stalin. But personality can dominate history it cannot make it. There are too many other factors. When we study the Crusades we all know the names of the leaders but how much do we know of the influences which determined their success or lack of it. In 1098 300,000 men besieged Antioch; in 1099 the 60,000 who were left captured Jerusalem; by 1100 only 20,000 remained. In 1190 100,000 arrived on a new crusade at Antioch. Famine, plague and desertion — the last caused chiefly by terror — reduced the force to 500. General Leclerc, a first class French general was sent in 1801 to Haiti to overcome the negro revolt under that greatest negro statesman of history — Toussaint l'Ouverture. 22,000 out of 25,000 men died of yellow fever. In such case what is the use of generalship? Quite recently a paper contributed to a medical periodical proved that a prime cause of Montgomery's desert victories was the superior health enjoyed by his men compared with the condition of the German army. A General to be successful must learn from history! There is much work still to be done in order to study the general causes of historical events, to discern underlying trends which alter the course of history.

Unfortunately historians are no quicker than any other class in learning their lessons. Long after the heat of battle and argument the embers that remain are fanned by the limited and the ignorant. This in European history is particularly true of the Reformation period. The English reformation is still by many attributed to the unworthy desire of an English king, Henry viii, to take a new wife, thus overlooking not merely the past history of English revolt from Roman claims but also the similar divorce cases on which the king based his case. How many know that two months prior to Henry's case his sister Margaret had obtained a divorce in Rome on far flimsier grounds; that a previous pope had granted Henry iv of Castile permission to have two wives but

that Henry viii refused such a suggestion with conscientious horror. Too many look to history to substantiate their own opinions. It can do that but its destiny is much higher. The philosopher who wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes was asserting an eternal truth when he wrote: "He who increaseth wisdom increaseth sorrow" or as it has been said in modern times: "God has given to every man a choice between truth and repose."

Committing oneself to any philosophy of history is accordingly an act of faith and that faith will receive many blows from this side and from that. The nineteenth century was proudly convinced of the certainty of human progress. We are much less certain. Yet we can take heart from the deep pessimism of so many leaders of the past: Wellington in the last year of his life thanked God that he would not live to see the ruin which was coming upon England; in 1790 Burke asserted: "France does not exist politically, it is expunged out of the Map of Europe", in 1847 Disraeli felt: "In industry, commerce and agriculture there is no hope". Just as great minds do not necessarily recognize the trends of their own day neither are they sound judges of the future. How long did it not take the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people to become an accepted historical idea. To quote from RANKE the greatest of German historians: "There is no political idea which has had so profound an influence in the course of the last few centuries as that of the sovereignty of the people. At times repressed and acting only on opinion, then breaking out again, openly confessed, never realised and perpetually intervening, it is the eternal ferment of the modern world." The strength of feeling behind the nineteenth century growth of the idea of nationality was also long unrecognized. As late as 1862 the Czar, Alexander II, invited Bismarck to enter the Russian service. Only in a communist state could such an offer be possible today and even there it would be unpopular! Historians like Buckle and Lecky allowed much too little for the strength of human emotions. It has taken the influence of Freud and of the modern school of psychology to explain much previously overlooked in the history of human personality and activity.

Burckhardt, in many ways perhaps the most influential of nineteenth century historians, with his deep insight into human affairs was certainly a most accurate prophet: "The most ominous thing is not the present era, but the era of wars upon which we have entered, and that is what the new spirit will have to adapt itself to. How much, how very much that men of culture have

loved will they have to throw overboard as spiritual luxury!... To me, as a teacher of history, a very peculiar phenomenon has taken place namely the sudden devaluation of all mere 'events' of the past. From now on, my lectures will stress the history of ideas, retaining only an indispensable scaffolding of events." Burckhardt hated those very things which he foresaw would inevitably mark the twentieth century — standardization, vulgarization, mere size but, most of all, he dreaded the worship of power. And yet even Burckhardt was very uncertain of his own historical aims. In 1874 he wrote to Nietzsche, then a great intellectual force now everywhere recognized his inferior: "My poor head was never capable, as yours is, of reflecting upon the ultimate reasons, aims and disabilities of historical science... My task was to put people into possession of that solid foundation which is indispensable to their further work if it is not to become aimless. I have done what I could to bring them to take personal possession of the past — in any shape or form — and at any rate not to sicken them of it."

This must be the aim of every historian, the obtaining of personal possession of the past, scattering one's net as widely as possible, keeping the mind open to every wind that blows and yet pursuing a journey on an even keel. Remembering that history is a school of political method, a storehouse of political precedent and a basis for political progress, but it is much more, it provides the substance for the studies of sociology, anthropology and archaeology, it enlightens much of our study of geography; there is no science which does not benefit from the historical approach. The means of civilization should never be mistaken for the ends. Modern inventions depend entirely for their value on the use to which they are put. The study of this use must be the method of historical enquiry. The work of the historian, in the widest sense, is therefore essential to an understanding of and mastery over our present civilization. His true function is the discovery of those universal patterns which bring order into what would otherwise be a chaos of individual facts and statements.

JAMES J. AUCHMUTY.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

*Summary of a Public Lecture delivered by
Dr. JAMES J. AUCHMUTY, Assistant Professor of
Modern History on April, 17, 1947.*

The United States Constitution is the first written constitution of the modern kind, based on the theory that the individual is an end in himself and the state a means to the fulfillment of that end; that the object of government is the good of the governed and that, generally speaking, that good is to be found in the happiness of the governed. Ethically it is true that happiness is not the sole end of life but it is the only one of which politics can presume to take account. Quite deliberately the Fathers of the American constitution decided that good administration is not necessarily good government and that to avoid tyranny and promote individualism it was better, at times, to have no government rather than a bad one. This attitude is a luxury possible only for certain states, desirable for all, explicable in terms of background but most unsuitable for many countries of the modern world. Despite the opinions of nineteenth century liberals, constitutions cannot be transferred ready-made, and it is even more foolish, as has been suggested in the case of India, to transfer a constitution suitable for a homogeneous people with a common political tradition to a sub-continent conspicuous for its varieties of racial and religious experience.

Although parliamentarianism on the liberal democratic pattern is of British origin, with the exception of the British dominions, the fifty or more states which have adopted this method of government have borrowed at second hand rather than copying the original. Why? Because the American, the French and the Belgian constitutions, which are the popular models, are all rigid and in writing and easy to copy; but the British constitution, unwritten, alive and growing is not easy to catch at any given time.

The result is that too many constitutions are copies of copies, strait jackets rather than vehicles for growth and expansion.

The American constitution is the product of its environment. The leaders of the revolution were nourished on the writings of Locke and on the traditions of the English Puritan revolution; by the expulsion of the French from Canada they were free of any dangerous enemy on the North American continent. The majority of immigrants had come to America to avoid religious persecution but by 1776 the old sectarian spirit had softened and opinion was influenced by Voltaire and Montesquieu to a conviction of the superior value of the British constitution. Nevertheless the thirteen original colonies felt no real sense of united national loyalty during the War of Independence, 1776-1783. A new constitution was essential after the war if the colonies were not to drift apart and become thirteen independent republics, many with very divergent industrial and cultural backgrounds.

In the constitution the influence of Montesquieu was predominant, that of the radical Tom Paine of little significance. In *L'Esprit des Lois* Montesquieu found the success of the British constitution to lie in the separation of the three great powers of government — executive, legislative and judicial. The 39 representatives who signed the draft constitution on September 17, 1787 had kept this very much in mind. The constitution provided for the unity of the nation in the person of a President, who unfortunately is both political and ceremonial head of the state, elected indirectly by the people of all the states; it recognized the equal sovereignty of the states in a Senate to which each state sent two representatives whose status was akin to that of an Ambassador; it acknowledged the sovereignty of the people in a House of Representatives whose members were proportional to the population. The executive was to have no share in the legislative body; members of the cabinet, a body which is not mentioned in the constitution, cannot sit in either branch of Congress. Finally a Supreme Court was established to act as guardian and interpreter of the constitution and this guardianship was actively extended during the long and notable career of Chief Justice Marshall.

The constitution specifically laid down those powers which fell to the central government, and the residue — a very considerable amount — are at the disposal of the states. The 48 states are in charge of local government, education, the police, the chartering of banks and companies, the care of roads, bridges and canals, and, most important, they have the power to decide who

is to vote and how, accordingly some states have kept negroes or those unable to pay a poll-tax from voting. It is the province of the Supreme Court to decide if or when the Federal and State governments are infringing on each others powers. As further checks on the dangers of tyranny frequent elections are provided for. The President and his understudy the Vice-President, a man almost without a job, have a four year term; a Senator sits for six years, and a Representative for two. As result the Senate has become the stronger branch of the legislature. Though the constitution is cumbrous, clumsy and slow it has had but 21 amendments in a century and a half. Save for Franklin Roosevelt no President has ruled for more than two terms. He is no longer elected by chosen intelligent leaders but in practice by a vote of the whole people, yet his policies may be nullified by the opposition of a legislature elected at a different time; the power of the Supreme Court has in political affairs, become too great; just as the position of the Cabinet is not sufficiently powerful and the American executive, not sitting in congress has by no means the experience or authority of a British cabinet. A flexible constitution of the British type could meet emergency situations much more quickly than a rigid American one. In a world dominated by the atomic bomb the latter may be outmoded, yet the frequency of elections, not merely to congress but also to positions in state and local government have made it the constitution of all the world most in touch with the people, it is a symbol of day by day democracy just as it is the first example of a successful federal constitution.

JAMES J. AUCHMUTY.

THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX IN CORIOLANUS

English scholarship, which is only beginning to accept the method of interpreting certain plays and poems as historical allegory, has displayed an even greater reluctance to apply the methods of psycho-analysis to literature. This reluctance appears to be based on the timorous view that something which is essential to literature may in this way be lost, be explained away; that, by too complete a mechanistic representation of the processes of artistic creation, the magic of the achievement may be analysed away.

This is a very narrow, bleak view to take of the endless variety of life, for it does not seem to me that the miracle of a flower's growth is in any way diminished by a knowledge of the behaviour of chromosomes, or that the marvel of a dog's intelligence is lessened by the discovery of the conditioned reflex. Science is still very far from being able to explain everything and psycho-analysis is beginning to adumbrate an unexplainable core to the strange world which is the human being, a core so far immeasurably deeper than the mere workings of the mind which, even in its unconscious functioning, no longer appears to be the final controlling force in our being. * Psycho-analysis does, however, help us to understand the significance to the human mind of certain myths and story patterns at different levels of consciousness and therefore enables us to understand why these myths persist and are popular.

Psycho-analysis helps us to understand why certain plays continue to be stage successes when the critics have condemned them as dramatic failures. We have all had the experience of feeling that a play is great without being able to find logical reasons for our feeling, and in this case our failure is not always due to our being without the necessary critical equipment, since the greatest and most practised critics have been as baffled as the ordinary play-goer. The most outstanding case of this, of course, is *Ham-*

(1) Georg Groddeck. *The Book of the It.*

let, and Dr. Ernest Jones * 1) has shown how the critics have consistently failed to evolve any satisfactory explanation of Hamlet's behaviour, or to get much beyond the judgement that the tragedy somehow fails in plot and in characterisation. And yet this play, in which Shakespeare is said to have failed to dramatise his material, has, even when translated into languages remote from English, a strange and powerful appeal to the imagination.

Dr. Ernest Jones who, with Otto Rank, is one of the few who combine mastery of psycho-analytical technique with a wide knowledge of art and literature, has worked out a convincing interpretation of the *Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark* as a variation on the Oedipus theme. Freud and Rank had previously observed the Oedipus symbolism in *Hamlet* and *Julius Caesar*, and it is my purpose in the following notes to attempt to extend this kind of treatment to the *Tragedy of Coriolanus*.

Once more the old accusation may be held up against one that one is getting out of the play more than the dramatist ever intended to put into it, but in this case it is of necessity so. Ernest Jones has pointed out that in *Hamlet* Shakespeare was not wholly conscious of what he was about, and that the reason why Hamlet could not understand his own reluctance to kill his uncle was that Shakespeare himself was not aware of the complex in himself which was working itself out in his creative conception of this old tale. It is possible that Sophocles, with his knowledge of medicine, was more aware than any other subsequent writer who has used this theme, up to the time of the discovery of the Oedipus Complex, of the especial cathartic value of the dramatic treatment of this myth. * 2).

Let us see how the tragedy fits this terrible ancient story. Coriolanus' father is dead and he is never mentioned in the play. The father-hatred which is a part of the myth now takes the quite usual form of revolt against authority (much revolutionary activity springs from this complex) and becomes, in this case, an impulse to destroy Rome. The corresponding father-admiration, the desire for identification with the father, has attempted to express itself in Coriolanus' candidature for consulship, and is perhaps involved in his ultimate failure to destroy the city. Rome therefore, in terms of the myth, is his father against whom he rebels and his father with whom he wishes to identify himself, and whose place

(1) Ernest Jones. *Essays in Applied Psychology*.

(2) Edmund Wilson. *The Wound and the Bow*.

he wishes to take; so that at different times and to his own astonishment (O world, thy slippery turns) he finds himself wishing to govern it and determined to ruin it.

The impatience of Coriolanus with the democratic formalities of election and his refusal to follow the conventions are an extension of the child's hatred of his father's authority at home, and a sign of the irrational depths from which his impulses spring.

Coriolanus' mother lives and occupies an unusually important place in his life. His attachment to his mother is well known in Rome and during the first lines of the play we are told by the First Citizen that the heroic deeds of Coriolanus were performed not for a patriotic reason but that "he did it to please his mother and to be partly proud." This is a point which is generally missed in making of the play a tragedy of pride. Shakespeare does not waste hints of this kind in opening scenes, the pleasing of his mother comes first and is sufficiently known in Rome to be common street gossip. It is a mutual love and Volumnia gives away a part of the secret when she says to the retiring Virgilia, Coriolanus' wife, "if my son were my husband, I should freelier rejoice in that absence wherein he won honour than in the embracements of his bed where he would show most love." (I.iii. 3-6) It is his mother who rejoices in his triumphal return in Act II scene i. His wife has to be pushed rather awkwardly forward and Coriolanus shows some bitterness as he observes her unjoyful behaviour.

Would'st thou have laughed had I come coffin'd home,

That weepst to see me triumph? II. i. 175-6.

There is a clear resemblance between the position of the unfortunate Virgilia and that of the puzzled Ophelia. These two pleasant, normal young women are each neglected by men who are involved in an emotional tangle which is beyond the comprehension of plain and simple love.

It is his mother's power over him which in the end induces Coriolanus to spare Rome, though, as I have already suggested, identification with Rome as father plays some part in it too. So this conflict of mother-love and father-hatred is never resolved and he fails to achieve the double purpose of the myth, the love of the mother and the death of the father. This is his tragedy and this is why he must die.

Here, considering the two plays as patterns of the Oedipus story, is the exact reverse of the Hamlet situation. Hamlet can at any moment destroy his uncle, who, as Ernest Jones has shown,

is in part a father-substitute and therefore an object of identification, but his mother's behaviour has already tarnished the love between them. Coriolanus, on the other hand, retains his mother's love but fails to destroy his father, the state of Rome.

In *Coriolanus*, as in *Hamlet*, Shakespeare shows an amazing intuition in working out the supporting details to this statement of the myth. Consistent with a mother-fixation is Coriolanus' admiration for chastity and cold-bloodedness in woman. This to me is the only reason for his commendation of Valeria, for which I can see no dramatic reason.

The noble sister of Publicola,
The moon of Rome; chaste as the icicle
That's curdied by the frost from purest snow
And hangs on Dian's temple: dear Valeria. V. iii. 63-6.

His destructiveness of nature is similar to the sadistic tendency which Freud observed to be associated in Leonardo da Vinci with a mother-fixation (1). (That disease of the mind, the desire to be a dictator, carries violence and cruelty with it. The Caesars, Napoleons and Hitlers of the lunatic asylums have to be locked up because of this. Otherwise their belief would be as harmless as Mr. Shaw's idea that he is as great as Shakespeare). This violence and destructiveness is cleverly repeated in his little son who so ferociously mammoicks the butterfly. The instinctive father hatred is charmingly illustrated in its inception in the behaviour of the little boy, for, when the women go out to meet Coriolanus who is advancing to destroy Rome, and there is talk of his treading on them, the boy flares up and says,

A shall not tread on me;
I'll run away till I'm bigger, but then I'll fight. V.iii. 129-130
So Shakespeare plays one of his most effective tricks with time, showing us face to face the hero as child and as grown man, the Oedipus complex in an early stage and in its terrible working out.

Thus the real tragedy of Coriolanus is not one of pride any more than that of Hamlet is one of over-meditation. The clue is given us by Shakespeare himself. He did it to please his mother.

The only justification for the applying of a psychoanalytical principle to a play, apart from providing a theory with yet another

(1) S. Freud. Leonardo da Vinci.

case-history, occurs when such application throws new light on obviously effective things in the play which cannot be adequately explained by ordinary critical methods. In the case of *Hamlet* psycho-analysis explains why a theme which appears to be unsuccessfully dramatised is capable of producing such a profound and universal effect. In the case of *Coriolanus*, although excessive and unusual pride may be the clue to much of his behaviour, it does not explain certain curious features of the play noted above, namely, Coriolanus' exaggerated and curiously timed admiration for chastity in woman, and the humble position of his wife throughout the play. The conventionally accepted pattern of the play as a conflict of pride against better impulses does not provide as rich or as poignant a view of the meeting outside Rome of the conqueror Coriolanus, the suppliant mother and the rebellious little son as emerges if the Oedipus myth pattern is applied. The situation then gains in interest and significance. The hero has half fulfilled the myth; but its fulfillment in the long run is not humanly possible. That is his tragedy and that is the inescapable fate that hangs over him.

The gods of Greek drama and the ineluctable forces they wielded have become the powers of the unconscious depths of the mind. The greatness of Shakespeare and Ibsen as modern dramatists is partly due to their intuitive realisation of this fact, a discovery subsequently elaborated and documented by Freud and others. Art once more has led and left to science the business of classification and statement in dead terms.

When a theme has previously been said to have been insufficiently or unsuccessfully dramatised, the judgement has been made in ignorance of the function of an underlying myth pattern, which may run contrapuntally to the action and of which the dramatist may be completely unconscious. But is there any reason why the dramatising of a theme should be limited to the conscious ordering by the dramatist of the material which his mind provides? That would surely be to impose too narrow and bleak a view of the creative process.

That awareness on the part of the dramatist of the function of the Oedipus complex as the mainspring of the action and his deliberate handling of it as such need not interfere with the effectiveness of a play has recently been demonstrated by Giraudoux in his *Electre*. But when a complex is raised to the conscious plane and becomes part of the logical structure of a play, then the un-

conscious counterpoint, which to a greater or lesser degree is apt to be present, may be provided by a quite different impulse from the unconscious life, an impulse of which the dramatist is therefore again unaware.

Herein lies the continuous interest of this kind of analytical procedure and its defence against the charge of destroying the wonder of a work of art.

GWYN WILLIAMS

L'ESPRIT DE SOLIDARITÉ CHEZ LES BÉDOUINS

(العصامية عند البدو)

Une loi absolue et infaillible a commandé et commande encore la vie bédouine : la loi de la solidarité. Partout dans les divers aspects de la vie quotidienne du bédouin, cette loi trouve facilement son application. La vie du désert est, en effet, pleine d'imprévus. Seuls les bras et les muscles du Bédouin le protègent dans l'immense étendue. Il n'existe ni autorité organisée et centralisée pour défendre sa cause, ni muraille fortifiée pour arrêter les assauts tentés par les brigands contre sa tente, aucune force de police n'est chargée de veiller sur ses troupeaux.

Cette vie, « plus que toute autre, impose à l'homme, pour subsister, un minimum de solidarité. Le Bédouin le réalise, dans la tribu, cellule instable, qui a une vie collective et des intérêts communs. L'unité de la tribu est un bien d'autant plus précieux, d'autant plus vanté, que l'individualisme le met sans cesse en péril » (1).

Ainsi la vie solitaire est-elle pour un bédouin le grand danger et exige-t-elle en contre partie un développement particulier de l'instinct de sociabilité. Le besoin de vivre en sécurité incite le Bédouin à être fort pour pouvoir se défendre. C'est dans l'association avec ses semblables qu'il espère trouver la force dont il a besoin. Toutefois, cette association sera plus efficace et plus durable si elle est faite avec des personnes auxquelles l'attachent des liens plus étroits que ceux de la simple solidarité humaine.

En d'autre terme, c'est par le lien du sang que l'homme cherchera, avant tout, à accroître sa puissance. De là, le désir ardent du Bédouin d'avoir une famille nombreuse, notamment des fils capables de porter, le cas échéant, les armes.

Les poètes arabes, dépositaires des traditions préislamiques, et gardiens de la loi du désert, proclamèrent sans cesse la néces-

(1) M. Gaudefroy Demonbynes, préface de l'Honneur chez les Arabes, par B. Farès, p. X, no. 2.

sité de maintenir des liens fraternels et soulignèrent sans arrêt celle de les conserver toujours plus serrés.

Qais ubn Asem (قيس بن عاصم) l'atteste :

أخاك ! أخاك ! إن من لا أخ له * كساع إلى الهيجا بغير سلاح

«Ton frère, ton frère (1) [Entendez : appuie-toi sur ton contribule] celui qui n'a point de frère est pareil à un guerrier sans armes qui s'élance vers le champ de bataille».

«Le fils d'un oncle (2), sache-le est pour l'homme une aile. Le faucon peut-il, sans ailes, prendre le vol ?» (3).

Abou Zoubaïd ut-ta'i (أبو زيد الطائي) proclame à son tour :

وان ابن عم المرء - فاعلم - جناحه * وهل ينهض البازي بغير جناح ؟

«Ne pas éviter de mécontenter les siens, négliger les liens de parenté est une maladresse (4)».

Aussi, la méchanceté d'un proche parent, quoique très pénible, est-elle plus supportable et plus facilement pardonnable que celle d'un étranger. On doit le ménager, le tirer d'embarras, persuadé que demain sans doute on éprouvera le besoin de la même solidarité.

ولا أدفع ابن العم بمشي على شفا * - وان بلغتني من أذى الجنادع -
ولكن أواسيه وأنى ذنوبه * لترجمه يوما إلى الرواجع

«Je ne pousserai pas mon parent qui marche au bord d'un abîme quand bien même les préludes du mal m'auraient atteints de sa part ;

«Au contraire, je l'aiderai largement et oublierai ses méfaits, afin qu'un jour les circonstances le fassent revenir vers moi. (5).

De son côté, Al Burj ubn Mushir attai, (البرج بن مسهر الطائي) regrette amèrement de s'être brouillé avec les siens et d'avoir cherché refuge

(1) Le mot «Ahh» (أخ) qui signifie «frère», sert à désigner un membre quelconque du groupe ethnique (Dictionnaire Al Misbah, 16); d'où, par extension, l'expression courante: «ya ahal arab» (يا أبا العرب) (O toi qui fait partie des Arabes) — Farès, l'Honneur chez les Arabes, p. 142. No. 4.

(2) Les termes «Ibn ul-'am», (ابن العم) qui veut dire «fils de l'oncle, cousin paternel», prend couramment le sens de «parent, contribule». De nos jours, «tous les membres d'un hamû-lah (حمولة) ou d'une 'achîrah (عشيرة) s'appellent entre eux, sans exception «ibn 'amm ou ahh...» (ابن عم أو أخ) ... Daghestâni Famille Musulmane en Syrie, p. 178.

(3) Buhturi; Hamâsa, p. 245, 10 et 11; Maïdâni, I, 21.

(4) Id., p. 244, 18.

(5) Id. p. 246, 16 et suiv.

auprès du clan des Banû Kalb, par suite de leur perfidie et de leur mauvaise conduite à son égard, il n'a pas réussi à entretenir longtemps des relations amicales avec eux. Il implore ensuite la bienveillance de son groupe ethnique; il déplore de l'avoir abandonné et d'avoir ainsi entraîné ses femmes hors d'une résidence sûre et défendable. Il fait vœu enfin de demeurer éternellement en bons termes avec lui, si, à l'avenir, l'occasion lui permet de retourner auprès de lui (1).

فنعم الحي (كلب) غير أنا * رأينا في جوارهم هنات
ونعم الحي (كلب) غير أنا * رزنا من بنين ومن بنات
فان القدر قد أمسى وأضحى * مقيمين (خبت) الى (المسات)
تركنا قومنا من حرب عام * الا يا قوم للامر الشتات !
واخرجنا الايامي من حصون * بها دار الاقامة والثبات
فان نرجع الى الجبلين يوما * نصالح قومنا حتى المات

Dans le même ordre d'idées, un autre poète déclare :

اعمري رهط المرء خير بقية * عليه ، وان عالوا به كل مركب
من الجانب الأقصى وان كان ذاغي * جزيل ، ولم يخبرك مثل بحرب

«J'en jure par ma vie, les proches parents d'un homme, quand bien même ils l'engageraient dans les pires difficultés, tiendront plus à sa vie et le secourront plus volontiers que les étrangers, même si ceux-ci vivent dans l'opulence. Personne ne peut mieux vous le dire qu'un homme instruit par l'expérience (2)».

Par ailleurs, le désert est une terre aride; il ne produit que de maigres herbes çà et là, à la limite d'une oasis ou à côté d'un puits. Aussi, voit-on souvent s'élever des contestations entre bergers au sujet de ces points fertiles et de leur occupation. De là des guerres continuelles, des luttes sans merci. De là aussi la nécessité absolue de collaborer étroitement entre membres d'un même groupe ethnique, clan ou tribu: tous pourront ainsi, le cas échéant, faire valoir leurs droits ou faire triompher leurs prétentions. De là enfin le besoin qu'éprouve le faible de trouver asile auprès du fort et d'être pris sous sa protection (3).

(1) Abû Tammam, Hamasa, I, 135-136.

(2) Ibid., I, 134, 6-7.

(3) cf., Ibn Haldûn, Muqaddima, p. 127 et suiv.

Telle fut, avant l'apparition de l'Islam, la vie des Bédouins dans la péninsule arabique : un esprit de solidarité (asabiyyah) qui, tout en laissant à l'individu une large liberté d'action, subordonnait l'exercice de cette liberté à l'intérêt commun. De son côté, l'individu n'éprouve aucun sentiment d'humiliation à s'effacer devant la collectivité dont il est membre. Il n'est même pas rare qu'il mette sa gloire propre dans celle du groupe. La solidarité entre membres du même groupe ethnique est telle, qu'un individu, tout en chantant ses propres exploits, essaie d'en attribuer le mérite à la collectivité toute entière. Le poète, à son tour, pour se glorifier, fait état dans ses poèmes, des hauts faits et des exploits accomplis par les siens.

Les joutes poétiques, extrêmement violentes souvent, qui mirent aux prises, à la fin du premier siècle de l'Hégire (VII^e siècle de l'ère chr.) plus de quatre vingts poètes, entre autres, Jarîr et al-Farazdaq, nous montrent quel fut l'esprit de solidarité arabe à l'état pur. Durant des années entières, chacun d'eux cherchait, parfois non sans peine, à vanter, non ses propres qualités mais celles de sa tribu. Il fouillait le passé de son groupe ethnique pour dégager ce qui lui apparaissait comme des actions d'éclat.

Quoiqu'en pleine période musulmane, les poètes en question utilisaient le procédé qu'employaient jadis leurs prédécesseurs de l'époque préislamique. Le genre littéraire reste le même, mais aux thèmes anciens s'ajoutent de nouveaux thèmes tirés de l'histoire de l'Islam. Al-Farazdaq se flatte et dit :

ان الذى حرم المكارم (تغلبا) * جعل النبوة والخلافة فينا
(مضر) ابى وأبو الملوك فهل لكم * يا آل (تغلب) من أب كأبينا
هذا ابن عمي في (دمشق) خليفة * لو شئت ساقكم الي قطينا

«Celui qui a refusé à Taghlib toute action noble et généreuse nous a accordé la dignité du prophète et le Califat.

«Mudar est mon aïeul et celui de souverains. Avez-vous, O Taghlib, un ancêtre comme le nôtre ?

«Mon cousin est Calife à Damas. Si je le voulais, il vous ferait mener comme des valets auprès de moi» (1).

Ce Farazdaq, brouillé avec Jarîr, ne s'en prend pas à son adversaire, mais à la tribu de celui-ci lorsqu'il déclare :

ان الزحام لغيركم فتحينوا * ورد العشي اليه بخلو المنهل
وانا ابن (حنظلة) الاغرم واننى * في آل (ضبة) المعجم الخول
فرعات قد بلغ السماء ذراها * واليهما من كل خوف يعقل

(1) Cf. Diwân Jarir, T. 2 p. 150 (طبعة ١٣١٣ هـ) ص ٢٠

أوصى عشية حين فارق رهطه * عند الشهادة في الصحيفة (دغفل)
 أن ابن (ضبة) كان خيرا والدا * وأتم في حسب الكرام وأفضل
 ممن يكون بنو (كليب) رهطه * أو من يكون اليهم يتخول (I)

«Les heures d'affluence ne sont pas pour vous, guettez plutôt le moment où les bêtes boivent le soir», c'est alors qu'il n'y a pas de monde à l'abreuvoir (2).

«Je suis le descendant de l'illustre Hanzala et j'ai, dans la tribu de Dabba beaucoup de glorieux oncles paternels et maternels.

«Deux rameaux dont le faite atteint le ciel; et c'est auprès d'eux qu'on cherche refuge contre toute crainte.

«Le soir, étant au plus mal, Daghfal (3) fait inscrire dans son testament: le descendant de Dabba a un père plus glorieux, plus noble...que quiconque a les Banus Kulaïb comme proches parents paternels ou les a comme oncles maternels.

«Son mérite propre, parmi les gens bien nés, l'emporte et, est meilleur... (4).

Par ailleurs, qu'un guerrier se distingue, qu'un poète s'illustre...la tribu entière s'honore. Un jour, se trouvant au lieu de réunion de Quraïch, «Utba ubn Rabi'ah (عتبة بن ربيعة) dit à ceux qui étaient avec lui: «Gens de Quraïch! N'irai-je pas trouver Muhammad pour lui parler et lui faire des propositions. Peut-être, en acceptera-t-il quelques-unes? Nous lui accorderons alors ce qu'il aura choisi et qu'il nous laisse en paix». — «Si, lui répondirent-ils. A son retour, après l'entrevue qu'il a eue avec le prophète, «Utba déclare: «J'ai entendu des propos. Par Allah, ce n'est point de la poésie, ni des Prédications. Gens de Quraïch! Ecoutez-moi et accordez-moi ceci: laissez cet homme et ce qu'il est en train de faire. Ecartez-vous de lui... Si les Arabes arrivent à l'atteindre d'autres vous auront ainsi épargné cette tâche. Et s'il triomphe des Arabes, alors son royaume sera votre royaume, sa gloire sera votre gloire et vous serez, grâce à lui, les plus heureux du monde» (5).

Le cri d'alarme et l'appel à l'aide s'adressent également à cette unité sociale qu'est le groupe ethnique. Yâla fulân! (يالفلان)

(1) cf. Diwân Tarîr, T. 2 p. 46; An-Naqâ'id (النقائض) p. 174

(2) Vous pouvez ainsi plus aisément faire boire vos troupeaux. Le poète les accuse d'être faibles au point de ne pas pouvoir se défendre, ce qui est une grande humiliation pour un Bédouin.

(3) Un généalogiste arabe appelé Daghfal fils de Hanzalah, de la tribu des Banû Chaï-bân (Qâmûs, T. III, 376).

(4) Naqa'id I, 187, 27 et suiv. (édit. A. Bevan, Leyde).

(5) 1. Hichâm, I, 179-180.

Holâ ! « Famille d'un tel, tribu d'un tel... » « Tout le groupe répondait à l'appel de l'un des siens et partageait la haine qu'il vouait à quiconque sur terre. Quand al-Barraq s'en fut délivrer sa fiancée, tout ses contribules lui prêtèrent leur concours » (1). Parlant de guerriers, al-Waddân ul-Mâziny (الودان المازني) s'écrie :

« Lorsqu'on leur crie « à l'aide », ils ne demandent pas à celui qui leur fait appel, ni pour quel combat, ni pour quel lieu » (2).

لا يسألون أحاهم حين يندبهم * في النائبات على ما قال برهانا

Ces traits et tant d'autres montrent d'une façon claire et évidente combien les liens d'amitié et de solidarité étaient serrés entre les contribules. « Ils ne demandent point à leur frère (entendez contribule) qui implore leur secours, dans le malheur, la preuve de ce qu'il avance ». Autant une action d'éclat accomplie par un membre de la tribu fait honneur à sa tribu toute entière, autant un méfait attire sur elle toutes sortes de calamités. « Quand un poète satirisait un individu quelconque, sa satire, automatiquement, s'étendait sur tout le groupe (3) » — Jarîr met en garde les Banû Hanîfa contre son emportement :

أبني (حنيفة) ! أحكموا سفاهكم * أني أخاف عليكم أن أغضبا
أبني (حنيفة) ! انني ان اهجمكم * أدع (اليعامة) لا تساوي أربنا

« Banû Hanîfa ! Empêchez vos hommes insolents [de m'irriter] ; je crains pour vous de m'emporter.

« Banû Hanîfa ! Certes, si je vous décochais une satire, al-Yamâma (4) ne vaudra plus le prix d'un lapin » (5).

Même si le poète ne vise dans ses invectives que son adversaire, il ne peut pas s'empêcher de faire allusion à la tribu et de faire supporter à celle-ci une part de responsabilité.

« C'est parce qu'ils avaient le même naçab (origine) que tous les membres d'un groupe se trouvaient offensés dès qu'un de leurs essayait un outrage ; le Prophète voyant Hassân-ubn-Thâbit (حسان بن ثابت) s'apprêter à jeter l'anathème aux Quraichites, lui dit : « Comment vas-tu les satiriser alors que je suis de Quraich ? » et

(1) B. Farès, l'Honneur... p. 140.

(2) I. Abd-Rabboh, al-'Iqd, 111, 88.

(3) B. Farès, l'Honneur..., p. 139.

(4) Nom du pays des Banû Hanîfa.

(5) Jarîr, Diwân, 1, 23 (Bas), édit. 1313 (Hég.).

Hassân de répondre: «je t'en extrairai comme l'on extrait un cheveu de la pâte» (1).

Cet esprit de solidarité se manifeste, d'autre part, lorsqu'un membre de la tribu est victime d'une agression quelconque ou se voit menacé. «Un jour les compagnons du Prophète se réunissent. Ils se disent les uns aux autres: «Par Allah! Quraïch n'a point entendu lire le Coran à haute voix. N'y aurai-il pas parmi nous quelqu'un qui le lui fasse entendre? — «Moi», répond Abd-ul-Allah ubn-Mas'ûd. (عبد الله بن مسعود) — Non, répliquent-ils, «Nous craignons pour toi les Quraïchites. Il nous faudrait quelqu'un ayant derrière lui une Achîrah (عشيرة) un groupe ethnique capable de le protéger contre eux s'ils venaient à lui en vouloir» — Laissez-moi aller», répond-il, «Allah me défendra» (2).

Umar-ubn-ul Hattâb, (عمر بن الخطاب) avant de se convertir à l'Islâm, veut aller trouver le Prophète. Sur son chemin, il rencontre Na'im-ubn Abdel-lâh, (نعيم بن عبد الله) qui lui demande où il allait. — Je vais trouver Muhammad, cet homme impie pour le tuer. — «Par Allah», réplique Na'im, tu as trop confiance en toi-même. Umar! Crois-tu que les Banû Abd el Manâf te laisseraient continuer à fouler le sol (c'est-à-dire de vivre) si tu venais à tuer Muhammad?» (3).

Enfin, lorsque Umar-ubn-ul Hattab embrasse l'Islâm, il va à la Ka'bah (الكلبة). Une dispute s'élève entre les Quraïchites qui s'y trouvent et lui. Alors survient un Quraïchite d'un âge avancé. Il s'approche et s'informe. «Umar a apostasié», lui répond-on «Eh bien, réplique-t-il, quelqu'un a-t-il fait son choix, que lui voulez-vous? Croyez-vous que les Banû-Adiyy, fils de Ka'ba, vous livrent ainsi leur homme? Laissez-le en paix» (4).

A. BOURHAM
Docteur ès Lettres
Professeur-adjoint
à la Faculté des Lettres
(Alexandrie)

(1) Farès, l'honneur... p. 145; Buhturyll, 167; Jamharah, 13; Aghâny, IV, 4 Zahr-ul-Adâb, 1, 62.

(2) 1. Hichâmi, 192-17 et suiv.

(3) Ibid. 1, 211, 9-12.

(4) Ibid. 1, 214, 5-11.

STEFAN GEORGE, FRIEDRICH GUNDOLF AND THE MAXIMIN MYTH

In the poetry written previous to *Der Siebente Ring* (1), Gundolf tells us, Stefan George has not shown us his god, but only his god's "effect on his own life, his coloured reflection on earth" ("Noch hat er nicht ihn geschaut, nur sein Wirken in eigenen Leben, seinen farbigen Abglanz auf der Erde"). Since the publication of the preceding volume, *Der Teppich des Lebens*, however, a momentous event has occurred: in Munich George met a boy whom he calls Maximin and who was apparently extremely attractive and gifted. Maximin died after three years spent in close contact with the George Circle, in 1904. In this youth the poet found the embodiment of his Ideal:

Um die Mitte des Lebens hat George den Menschen gefunden dessen Schönheit, Kraft, Glut, Reinheit, Fülle, Einfachheit, Adel, Anmut und Hoheit alles vergegenwärtigte was ihm je Geschichte bot, Zukunft verhieß. Sein eigenes Gebet, das göttliche Urbild und die menschliche Erscheinung waren eins geworden in Maximin.

(In the middle of his life George has found the human being whose beauty, strength, fervour, purity, abundance, simplicity, nobility, grace and grandeur actualised everything that history offered him and the future promised. George's own prayer, the divine archetype and the human appearance had become one in Maximin) (2).

(1) 6 published volumes, that is, including *Das Jahr der Seele* (1897), which I believe contains that part of George's work which will survive long after the George Circle and the traditions of the Master have been forgotten; it is the last book in which George's poetic abilities prevail over his prophetic ambitions. In the title of the volume now under discussion (published in 1907) *Ring* is a reference to the rings visible in the cross-section of a tree-trunk, *Siebente* to the fact that this is George's seventh book of verse.

(2) *George*, Friedrich Gundolf (Berlin, 1916). A momentous book: the priest expounding the priest who expounds the God. Our objection is that Gundolf is concerned with 'Georgeanism' instead of with George's poetry; and that furthermore, instead of dealing honestly with the philosophy of the movement, his intention is to bolster up the mystico-aesthetic esotericism of the Circle by a clever mingling of logical exposition and emotive, poetic prose.

George's great desideration — "the deification of the body and the embodiment of the deity" — had come to pass; the messenger from "the beautiful life" (who appeared in the previous volume) has been followed by the God of "the beautiful life". Gundolf is at some pains to explain and justify this phenomenon, to give it its logical place in Georgeanism — which of course must be at the very centre — and to shame those who might feel inclined to snigger or guffaw:

Nur wem ein schöner Mensch Gott werden kann hat Augen für die Göttlichkeit des schönen Alls... Wer Georges Gedichte aus ihrem eigentlichen Ursprung empfindet der erstaunt nicht, in der Mitte seiner hellenisch-katholischen Welt eine Gottmensch-gestalt zu finden.

(Only he for whom a beautiful human can become God has eyes for the divinity of the beautiful universe ...He who experiences George's poems from their proper source will not be surprised to find the figure of a God-Man at the centre of his hellenic-catholic world) (3).

Gundolf goes on to say that Germany and Greece are the only two nations for whom youth is more than *Naturzustand* (a natural state) — for whom youth is, in fact, *Geistlage* (a spiritual condition); he mentions particular examples — Achilles, Alcibiades, Alexander, Siegfried, Conradin (the last of the Hohenstaufens) and Hölderlin; and he closes his argument by declaring that George's deification of a contemporary German youth is

der Ursprung seines Dichtens, der Grund seines Wesens, die Kraft seiner Welt

(the fountainhead of his poetic work, the foundation of his nature, the strength of his world).

George's own account of the significance of Maximin (told in his *Maximin-Gedenkbuch*) tells us little more than we have gathered from Gundolf's remarks; here is an extract:

(3) Turning to the earlier poet, Friedrich Hölderlin (as the student of George is bound to do, sometimes for explanation, sometimes for relief), we may compare this with what Hyperion, in the novel of that name, says about the Athenians:

Der Mensch ist aber ein Gott, sobald er Mensch ist. Und ist er ein Gott, so ist er schön.

(Man is a god, however, as soon as he is man. And if he is a god then he is beautiful.)

In him we recognised the embodiment of the omnipotent youth we had dreamed of, with its unbroken richness and purity, which even today moves hills and walks on the waters with dry feet — a youth that could receive our heritage and conquer new empires... The better we came to know him the more he reminded us of our ideal and the more we revered the extent of his unspoiled mind and the emotions of his heroic soul as well as their expression in his appearance, his gestures and his language...

...we writhed at the meaningless, torturing thought that we could never more touch those hands, that those lips could never more meet ours...

We now can eagerly, after impassioned signs of veneration, erect his statue in our sanctuary, kneel before him and worship him, as we were prevented from doing by timidity as long as he was still among us (4).

Obviously the Maximin experience was of great importance in George's development; not, I think, in that it revealed to him any divine and hitherto unacknowledged truth, but rather by confirming him in the views which he already held, in just the same way that "Diotima" — a real woman — had encouraged Hölderlin more than a century before, by demonstrating the human possibility of achieving his ideals:

Die Zeit doch heilt. Die Himmlischen sind jetzt stark,
Sind schnell. Nimmt denn nicht schon ihr altes
Freudiges Recht die Natur sich wieder?
Sieh! eh noch unser Hügel, o Liebe, sinkt,
Geschiehs, und ja! noch siehet mein sterblich Lied
Den Tag, der, Diotima! nächst den
Göttern mit Helden dich nennt, und dir gleicht
(Time heals though. Strong and swift are the gods today,
And is not Nature reassuming
All of her ancient and joyful power?
O Love, before our path shall descend, her reign
Shall come! And that day yet shall my mortal song
Behold, which, Diotima! naming
You with the heroes and gods, reflects you.

Diotima, trans. J.B. Leishman)

(4) Quoted by Capetanakis, *Demetrius Capetanakis: A Greek Poet in England* (London, 1947).

Therefore the commentator should not lay too much emphasis upon this rather obscure affair, for both poetic and 'philosophical' evidence indicates that it was more a personal crisis than artistic or religious apocalypse, and the poetry written afterwards is quite in line with that which preceded the Maximin experience — it is simply more explicit, more confident, more openly didactic. The boy-god's death was to George no tragedy: it was simply the confirmation of his godhead through sacrifice and, thus, the final confirmation of George's belief in the beautiful body and the beautiful spirit and in their union—it was, also, another reason for demanding obedience and dedication from those who remained (5). Hence his work is not made warmer and more 'human' through participation in the common sorrow of bereavement; on the contrary, it has become harder, colder, more self-confident and even less concerned with being persuasive when dealing with matters that are far from self-evident. Maximin is the centre of *Der Siebente Ring*, and *Der Siebente Ring* is the centre of George's canon: yet Maximin's influence on the poet was essentially unfortunate since it served to accentuate his weaknesses, to assure him beyond all doubt that his way was the right way, and to confirm him once and for all in his rôle of prophet and teacher. Worst of all, perhaps, Maximin became George's substitute for a clear definition of his beliefs: there, he seems to say as he points to Maximin, is the whole of my belief — but Maximin is dead, and *we* have only the poetry to go by.

But I must qualify what I said about Maximin's death not being regarded by George as a tragedy. *Ex cathedra* that was so; but the poet (whatever his relationship with Maximin may have been) had also lost a beloved friend, and the poem *Trauer*, with its unemphatic desolation, its quiet economical record of hopelessness, is a lament for the death of a friend rather than for the passing of a god:

Weh ruft vom walde.

(5) Both Jethro Bithell (*Modern German Literature*) and Professor E.M. Butler (*The Tyranny of Greece over Germany*) remark that the discovery of the God in Maximin came at a very convenient time for George. Three of his disciples, Wolfskehl, Schuler and Klages, had just begun a revolt against the Master's glorification of the Male Principle: their new gospel was the *Mutterrecht* of Bachofen, in which Woman (the Mother) is the great fundamental principle of life. It was necessary that George should exert his authority, and Maximin was convenient in being "schoen wie kein bild und greifbar wie kein traum" ("beautiful as no image, palpable as no dream"). But this does not prove that Maximin was produced solely as a species of *panem et circenses* to still the insurgents.

Er schmückte sich mit frischem laub umsonst.
Die flur erharrte dich dass du sie weihstest
Sie friert da du sie nun nicht sonnst :
Die zarten halme zittern an der halde
Die du nun nie beschreitest.

Was sind die knospen all die du nicht weckst,
Die äste all die deine hand nicht flicht,
Was sind die blumen all die sie nicht bricht,
Was sollen früchte sein die du nicht schmeckst !

Im jungen schlag ein krachen
Von stamm nach stamm - wann fällt der nächste?
Das morgendliche grün erschlaft,
Das kaum entsprossne gras liegt hingerafft.
Kein vogel singt... nur frostiger winde lachen
Und dann der schall der äxte.

(Woods cry in anguish.
In vain they decked themselves in leaves of spring,
The field awaited you to bless it, numb
With cold, since now no sun you bring :
The fragile grasses on the hillside languish
Where now you never come.

What are the buddings that you do not wake,
The branches that your fingers do not weave,
What are the flowers that you do not reave,
The fruits you do not taste - whom shall they slake?

In sappy timber cracking
Of stem for stem - what next is bowed?
The morning green is growing worn,
The blades scarce risen upward, lying shorn,
No bird sings... only frosty winds are clacking,
And then the axe is loud.

Sorrow, trans. C.N. Valhope and E. Morwitz)

This is personal in a way that little of George's poetry is personal :
but so keenly is the personal sorrow felt, and yet so firmly controlled,
that at this moment more than at any other we are near
to believing that authentic deity has appeared on earth. Much
nearer to believing this than when we are bleakly *told* that such
has happened and loudly exhorted to cultivate a new cheerfulness :

Vereint euch froh da ihr nicht mehr beklommen
Vor lang verwichner pracht erröten müsst :

Auch ihr habt eines gottes ruf vernommen
Und eines gottes mund hat euch geküsst.
Nun klagt nicht mehr - denn auch ihr wart erkoren -
Dass eure tage unerfüllt entschwebt...
Preist eure stadt die einen gott geboren!
Preist eure zeit in der ein gott gelebt!
(Unite in gladness, now no longer darkened
And flushing for an age whose gold is flown:
The calling of a god you too have hearkened,
It was a god whose mouth has kissed your own.
You also were elect - no longer mourn
For all your days in unfulfilment sheathed...
Praise to your city where a god was born!
Praise to your age in which a god has breathed!

On the Life and Death of Maximin, trans.
C.N. Valhope and E. Morwitz)

Der Siebente Ring celebrates the appearance of a god on earth: the body has been deified and the deity has been embodied. The 'search for God' seems to have ended successfully. Yet the incarnation of the god has not clarified the nature of the god, and our conception of what George means by *das schöne Leben* — the beautiful life or the life of beauty — is as nebulous as it ever was: still only a conglomeration of the imprecise and even dubious ideas broached in the earlier books — the People (*das Volk*, not to be confused with 'people', *die tausendköpfige Menge*), the young knight, Greek wrestler and medieval minstrel of the *Bücher der Hirten - und Preisgedichte*, usw., the Roman priest-emperor of *Algalal*, the "new love" that "alone can bring a new salvation", the mystical significance of Youth (which, however, we should not confuse with the Fascist boasting of *giovinetza*), "unser geist begierig nach verehrung" (6)... and all this, to further bewilder him who is rash enough to embark on an examination of the credentials of "the beautiful life", is backed up by appeals to such diverse figures as Goethe, Nietzsche, Pope Leo XIII, Frederick II, Jean Paul, Dante, Hölderlin, Rembrandt, Napoleon, Christ...

Gundolf describes this volume and the following one, *Der Stern des Bundes*, as "both of them holy writings" ("heilige Schriften"); but even he feels compelled to modify this description, to throw a sop to the idea of the poet as Poet:

(6) "our spirit eager to revere", *Leo XIII*, (*Der Siebente Ring*).

Nichts liegt George ferner als Religion zu stiften, Mythos zu machen oder etwa gar einen Maximin-kult einzusetzen... Wenn das Maximin-buch eine heilige Schrift ist, so ist es das, weil ein heiliges Herz hier einfach ausspricht was ihm widerfahren, und der wird es am besten lesen der seine Belesenheit über das Wesen und die Formen der Religion oder der Hymnik schweigt vor dem Schlag dieses Herzens.

(Nothing is further from George than the foundation of a religion or the making of a myth or even the institution of a Maximin-cult... If the Maximin-book is a holy writing then it is because here a holy heart simply expresses what befalls, and he will understand it best who keeps his book-learning about the nature and forms of religion or the Hymn silent before the beating of this heart).

The last phrase — "before the beating of this heart" — may seem to be strangely at odds with Gundolf's earlier contempt for those who found in the *Jahr der Seele* "a programme music to a heart-text" (7)... and how are we to reconcile these qualifications and modifications with the dogmatic statement which Gundolf has only just previously made, that

...erst seit dem Erscheinen Maximins wird für George sein Lebensgesetz, sein Schön und Hässlich, Gut und Schlecht, Hoch und Niedrig über sein eigenes Leben hinaus mehr und mehr zum Weltgesetz, d.h. zum Gottes-Reich?

(...only since the appearance of Maximin has the law of George's life, his beautiful and Ugly, Good and Evil, High and Low, spread beyond his personal life, passing more and more into a world-law, i.e. the Kingdom of God).

If we have been informed that it is through Maximin that George's private, personal law or morality has developed into a universal law, a categorical imperative, the very Kingdom of God, then it is hardly logical to instruct us, almost in the same breath, to forget all about religion, myth and cult and simply listen in silence to "the beating of this heart". After all this (and the momentous impli-

(7) See the chapter dealing with the *Jahr der Seele*:

Das "Jahr" das wir hier mitwandeln ist weder ein äusserer Ablauf von Naturvorgängen noch eine landschaftsmalerische Programmmusik zu einem Herzenstext...

(The "Year" with which we wander here is neither an external unfolding of natural events nor a landscape-painter's programme music to a heart-text...).

cations of the previous books), we shall not be content to discover that Maximin's heart beats in the same way as our own frail, fallible human hearts — and, moving from heart-beat to flute-song, has not George himself in a poem from this volume promised

dass morgen
Leicht alle schönheit kraft und grösse steigt
Aus eines knaben stillem flötenlied?

(that tomorrow
All beauty, greatness, strength will lightly rise
Out of the quiet flute-song of a boy) (8).

We see that Gundolf, at one moment, is eager above all to dissociate his master from the various political, ethical, religious and philosophical panaceas current in the first two decades of this century and to single him out for a special kind of attention, as the performer of a different kind of function, as the Poet, whose concern is with the beating of the heart and with the emotions which life arouses. We see, too, that the next moment — in order to stress the overwhelming significance and the ubiquitous importance of George's work — he speaks of him in terms which inevitably carry with them philosophical, religious, ethical and even political implications: the heart is to beat to a new rhythm, life is to be wholly transfigured, poetry has been transformed into a

(8) Compare this and many other passages — eg. "Du geist der heiligen jugend unsres volks" ("You spirit of our nation's sacred youth") from a poem of the *Stern des Bundes* — with the conclusion of an early poem by Hoelderlin:

Der Gott der Jugend waltet
Noch ueber dir und mir
(The God of Youth still governs
Over you and me.

from *Der Gott der Jugend*)

But apart from an occasional nostalgia for his earlier years Hoelderlin never shows signs of any great enthusiasm for Youth in the Georgean sense. Yet his epigram, *Sokrates und Alkibiades*, contains the very essence of Georgeanism — raising the question that the reader might well put to George and proposing the answer that George might well have given:

Wer das Tiefste gedacht, liebt das Lebendigste...

(Who has thought most deeply, loves what is most alive...)

That the answer is here expressed with a greater clarity (and, indeed, with a greater cogency) than George, at far greater pains than Hoelderlin, ever achieved, is perhaps due to the fact that Hoelderlin had less at stake: he never attempted to erect momentous structures upon either Youth or Beauty.

combination of myth and morality, the poet has turned into a priest who, in spite of his aloofness, keeps a sharp eye on his parishioners' secular activities... What is the reason for this exegetical uncertainty, this vacillation so strange in a person of Gundolf's intellect? The only reasonable explanation we can offer is that, against his will, Gundolf is forced to realise the disparity between the claims he is making for Georges's poetry and that poetry itself. "Georgeanism" has gone further than George's poetry warrants, and here we find its chief apostle involved in somewhat desperate (and not altogether honest) attempts to wrench the two into conformity.

D. J. ENRIGHT

DISTINCTIONS IN LITERARY CRITICISM

... Κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα, ἢ
πέφυνκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν,
κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπον χρώμενον.

PLATO (Phaedrus)

That we live in a scientific age is a fact of which we neither wish nor need to be reminded. But the platitude inherent in this pertinent truth may be glossed by observing that the Renaissance was, in contrast to our own, an artistic age. So indeed were many other ages. But the Renaissance offers a more striking contrast, because it also affords a basis of comparison; that is to say, that whereas *we* adopt a scientific attitude even towards art, *it* adopted an artistic attitude towards science. For illustration, one has only to recall Leonardo da Vinci, whose mechanical and anatomical diagrams were finished works of art; or his letters, in which he refers to his own mechanical genius in terms reminiscent of those in which Prospero or Glendower boasted proud control of the spirit world. Or again, one may think of Machiavelli, whose political science found room for an epic hero in the person of Cesare Borgia. And then, there are those old charts, which, with their dolphins, sirens, sea-serpents, cannibals, and chubby-cheeked wind-gods, indeed resemble

...magic casements opening on the foam
Of perilous seas in faery lands forlorn,

rather than an objective record of discovery.

As against this, in our own era, we may set the tortured theorising of successive modern schools of painting, modern textual criticism of literature and the proud title of "Scientific Bibliography" claimed by Professor Dover Wilson for his method; and more significant still, the invocation of psychology to lend a scientific flavour to the novel and to poetry. Only recently a writer in the

"Fortnightly" deprecated the scientific or analytical tendency in literary criticism as dry and uninspired (1). Yet it is just in the field of literary criticism that the modern scientific spirit may hope to encroach upon the frontiers of Art with some success.

It would perhaps be audacious to claim that literary criticism is more a science than an art. Such distinctions have to be preceded by very careful definition, and though we might venture to specify that the functions of science and art are respectively to discover new truth and to illuminate truth already known, there remains an objection to assembling the critical faculty without qualification in the realm of science. Indeed, the boundary line cuts literary criticism in two; while there are types of criticism which lie on the border, some owing their position to the critic's choice, others to his indecision. Hazlitt, for instance, is a predominantly artistic critic. Anyone who undertakes, as he did, that a genuine criticism should reflect "the colour, the light and shade, the soul and body of a work," is surely more concerned with illustration than with discovery in a definitive sense. Coleridge, on the other hand, is frankly definitive in his approach. He does not hesitate to assume that task, summarily rejected by Wordsworth, of "classing the cabinet of his sensations". Coleridge in his criticism is unquestionably a scientist.

With "artistic" criticism the present study is not concerned. It sets out, however, to impeach "scientific" criticism for not being, in many cases, as scientific as its general tone and style lead the reader to expect. That there is scope for such scientific criticism goes without saying. Literary criticism can be to literature what psychology is to life. Both sciences conduct an enquiry into the human mind. But as psychology reaches its ends mainly by analysis of the subnormal mind, criticism claims the abnormal, that is to say the super-normal, as its sphere, and makes genius, not mania, its starting-point. It is therefore desirable that anyone who undertakes literary criticism in a scientific spirit should adhere to scientific procedure, and one of the first essentials is an agreement as to the meaning of terms.

It is just this point in which the science of literary criticism has been so unfortunately lacking. Aristotle certainly tried to give criticism a scientific basis at what may be considered its birth. But data has accumulated since Aristotle's day. We have more phenomena to explain than were "dreamt of in his philosophy".

(1) John Arlot in an article on C. Day Lewis' "The Poetic Image". (The "Fortnightly". June 1947).

The first ambiguity that must occur to anyone who deplors the chaotic state of critical terminology must centre round that word "poetry". For the way in which we understand it determines our attitude to major distinctions; or rather, it determines just what major and basic distinctions we will make. Few critics would be prepared to regard *poetry* and *verse* as synonymous; yet very few theoretical, that is to say scientific, critics avoid implying as much, when they venture to discuss these terms. And they imply, in this way, what they would almost certainly repudiate, not by direct confusion of the terms in question, but by the confusion of the opposites of those terms in the use of the single word "prose".

The importance of the question becomes clear when a critic begins to dogmatise about the "proper language" of verse or prose, or whenever *vers libre* is being discussed, to cite only two occasions where the point at issue is prejudiced by an unscientific application of terms.

Examine this sentence from Coleridge: "I write in metre because I am about to use a language essentially different from that of prose." We may take "metre" here as synonymous with *verse*. But what is meant by "prose"? Non-metrical composition? Such an interpretation is not helpful. "I write in metre because I am about to use a language different from that of non-metre"! An earnest enquirer may feel like the inquisitive child, who, in answer to his reiterated "why?", at last gets the exasperated ultimatum: "Because it is so"!

Yet if we take "prose" as the antithesis not of metre but of poetry, Coleridge appears to beg the question: "I write in metre because I am about to use a language that is not prosaic (i.e. a language that is poetic)." *But the necessary connection between verse and poetry is the point at issue, and cannot be assumed in this way.* Surely, this is the very connection which he is asserting in the teeth of Wordsworth's denial that there is or can be "any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition."

Coleridge has been misled by the ambiguity of the word "prose". Because he uses a word which has two senses, he assumes that he has established a real, as distinct from a purely verbal, association between the two senses. His argument would seem to be: "Since there is a clear connection between non-metrical and prosaic language (as is proved by the general use of the word "prose" to cover both meanings), so we may take it that there is

a connection between metrical and poetic language." One is not here questioning the conclusion, but the argument. The popular use of a word to cover two meanings does not prove anything. It admittedly represents an association in the popular mind. But it remains for the scientist to arbitrate as to the reality or speciousness of that association.

This is disconcerting, especially when one recollects the controversies and fashionable prejudices which have accumulated round the work of Dryden and Pope, not to mention any of their contemporaries or imitators. For it has been both asserted and denied that Dryden and Pope were no "poets", and that their verse was "prosaic". How can anyone venture on such a topic without the clearest notion of what he means by such terms as "poetry", "prose", and "verse"?

This trio of terms is a peculiarly unfortunate one. It is a case of: "Two's company, three's none." If we regard verse as the opposite of prose, and at the same time as something of a different order from poetry, of what is poetry the opposite? The assumptions which bring us to this dilemma are surely reasonable, and do no violence to the popular and received usage of words. Verse is readily distinguished from poetry in doggerel. "Verse in prose" sounds like nonsense, so we can safely take the two terms as counterparts, mutually exclusive. If, however, "prosaic verse" has quite a different implication and a readily apprehended meaning, it is due to the treacherous ambiguity of the word "prose". "Prosaic" is the opposite not of "verse" or "metrical", but of "poetic". The adjective marks a different contrast from that indicated by the noun. Could we not adopt some such word as "dissertation" to express the alternative to "poetry", and retain "prose" only as the opposite of "verse"?

Turning again the pages of the "Biographia Literaria", we find Coleridge criticising three stanzas from Daniel's "Civil Wars". Coleridge's terms are here prejudicial because he describes Daniel as "prosaic", and the ambiguity of that word has been made clear. But even apart from the question of ambiguity, the word has an unfortunate connotation. In fact, the word "poetic" suffers in much the same way, though as a critical term it is indispensable. For "prosaic" has a bad, and "poetic" a good connotation. That is to say, the terms are used more or less synonymously with "unimaginative" and "imaginative". One would never accuse the style of a cookery-book of being "unimaginative," because imagination is not a quality which one would

expect or desire in a cookery-book. "Imaginative", as a critical term then, means desirably imaginative, and "unimaginative" means undesirably unimaginative. And it is just because "prosaic" and "poetic" can be equated with these meanings that they become dangerous as terms to express two contrasted literary faculties. In the instance referred to above, Coleridge is using the word together with its connotation, in such a way as to suggest that the connotation follows from the meaning. These stanzas, he seems to say, exemplify a faculty other than that of poetry; they are of prose, prosaic; being prosaic, they are unimaginative. And "unimaginative", as we have seen, implies a defect. This is not logic. It is playing on words.

But however prejudicial Coleridge's terms are, the issue which he raises is significant: is dissertation in verse (to use our own term) a tolerable form of literature? Is verse, except as a vehicle of poetry, never justified? Our first instinct is to answer "No, never", making allowance, as Coleridge does, for mnemonic rhymes, doggerel, and necessarily pedestrian parts in long poems. Indeed, the last instance hardly amounts to an exception, as here the effect is *ultimately* poetic. But the full force of the question is not felt until one looks for the corollary. If dissertation in verse is intolerable, we shall be expected to condemn poetry in prose. Is prose never justified except as a vehicle of dissertation? It becomes very hard to be consistent. What a quantity of prose has been praised for the poetry which it contained! In this connection, one has only to mention the name of Sir Thomas Browne; and we do not feel that he needs any special pleading to justify the poetic qualities of his work! Yet on the other hand, for how long had it been, till comparatively recent times, the conventional attack on Dryden and Pope that their work amounted to mere prose? By which word must have been intended "dissertation", for nobody would wish to deny the faculty of versification to those writers. Coleridge alludes to a type of language which would be "vicious and alien in correct and manly prose." But he probably shirked stigmatising any prose passage for being poetic, in the way that he criticised Daniel's lines, specifically, for being prosaic, because he felt instinctively that such a criticism would, like Balaam's curse, resolve itself into a blessing. As has been observed, it is hard to call anything poetic without implying praise, just as it is hard to label anything prosaic without implying censure.

But if terms have acquired this misleading nature, it is at least

worth while investigating how they acquired it. Have we simply been prejudiced by the arbitrary use of terms? Or is there "method in their madness"? Have they acquired their misleading nature as a result of some fundamental prejudice in our own attitude?

To begin with, it would be well to define exactly what we mean by poetry and dissertation, and we may conveniently define them in terms which have themselves been defined at the outset of this study. By poetry, we mean the artistic use of language, and by dissertation, the scientific use of language. Poetry uses words to illuminate, dissertation to designate. The language of poetry has an explicit meaning, but it implies much more than that meaning; it illuminates the meaning in a way that music or painting illuminates. Dissertation, on the other hand, aims at achieving no more and no less than the explicit meaning. To the extent that it implies or suggests the indefinable it is either alloyed or vitiated.

But indeed, the greater part of literary composition is an alloy between poetry and dissertation. The two faculties are not easily found in their pure state - perhaps cannot be. It is vain to classify a work as poetry, and bind it accordingly to the observance of preconceived rules. One can only estimate that a writer's purpose lies at a certain pitch between poetry and dissertation, and murmur reproof if he takes a plunge too far in one direction or the other, or if his purpose itself entertains incongruities. Thus poetry and dissertation are more safely regarded, not as different faculties, but as different elements in the one faculty of literary composition; and the scientific critic will find it more convenient to speak, not of poets and writers of dissertation, but simply of writers or authors, in general.

Now what of verse and prose? These also are no hard and fast species. The Greeks spoke of their choruses as "logaoedic" compositions, suggesting that these, with their irregular and changing rhythms, were half-way between prose and verse. Much of Shakespeare's mature blank verse could be written in prose form without devastating loss; and modern *vers libre* represents just such another compromise - not to mention many parts of the Scriptures. There are even novelists who in their lyrical moments cross the border completely into verse, let alone linger on the brink of it. In such instances, it is not just a question of *poetry*, but of actual verse.

Wordsworth attributes to metre "the pleasure which the mind derives from the perception of similitude in dissimilitude." He

observes: "From this principle the direction of the sexual appetite, and all passions connected with it, take their origin... It would not be a useless employment to apply this principle to the consideration of metre, and to show that metre is hence enabled to afford much pleasure." This would stand as a very good definition of verse (by which we must understand something rather wider than metre, (1) something that will embrace the parallelism of Hebrew poetry). But in brief, we may say that verse is the adoption of more or less regular repetition in our language, prose its deliberate and studied avoidance; always bearing in mind that "regular" is a comparative term. Perhaps, even considerable tracts of our conversation have a loose verse form, comparable with *vers libre*; in which case, the Bourgeois Gentilhomme had not been talking prose all his life, after all. But prose, as a literary faculty or form, surely implies the *studied* avoidance of repetition, just as verse implies its *studied* cultivation.

But what connection have verse and prose with poetry and dissertation? To deny any correspondence between verse and poetry, even while rejecting their entire interdependence, would be taking too great a liberty with the ordinary associations of words. Let us formulate the connection as follows: - Verse originated as a "useful" art, as distinct from the "fine" art into which it later developed. It was first purely utilitarian in function, as an aid to memory, but later was adopted as a musical principle, that is to say, as a means to an artistic purpose, not as a means to a utilitarian purpose attended sometimes by incidentally artistic effects.

Now if poetry is the artistic use of language, verse, in so far as it serves an artistic purpose, is a contribution to poetry; though everything that is poetry will not employ the means of verse. There are other means. Roughly speaking, we may divide the sources of poetry into two: — lyric and graphic, to give them names. And in anticipation of protests, let it be said that the term «lyric» is much more usefully employed in denoting the musical element in poetry than as a vague word for any kind of short poem that lends itself to the anthologist. To the lyric element then, verse contributes. But even the lyric element in poetry may exist independently of verse. Sounds may be arranged for artistic

(1) Metre, rhyme, and alliterative verse are subdivisions of acoustic verse, as contrasted with the graphic or pictorial verse principle exemplified by Hebrew parallelism.

effect without involving a degree of regularity which qualifies them to be regarded as verse.

In addition, however, to this lyric element, we have to consider the graphic sources of poetry, the use of images, the pictorial as distinct from the musical content. Both elements are responsible for that artistic effect which distinguishes poetry from dissertation and gives to words an illuminating power that is not inherent in their mere meaning. The explicit meaning of the words is an element of dissertation which is, nevertheless, inevitable in poetry. Swinburne did his best to minimise this element; and perhaps when people talk about «pure poetry», they have in mind a type of poetry which would depend entirely on musical or pictorial effect, without reference to the sense of the words. James Joyce's work suggests an experiment in this direction. But it is probable that too much «purity» in art, as in eugenics, results in the loss of virility. And in the same way painters and sculptors may go too far in rejecting the humble propositions of what they call «representationalism.».

In poetry, however, the sense of the words does not merely provide a theme, to be embroidered with sounds and images. It may make a more subtle artistic contribution. One finds this so in Hebrew poetry, where the verse does not consist in the similitude of metre contrasting with the dissimilitude of the words, but in the similitude of the explicit meaning, which is restated in different words. The explicit meaning, then, discharges that function which is assigned to metre in most European poetry. It is precisely the meaning of the words which informs them with the properties of verse. For this reason Hebrew verse must remain verse (even as distinct from poetry) in translation. And as each restatement of the sense is apt to evoke a different picture, we may say that such verse is based on imaginative, (1) not acoustic repetition, and that its contribution to poetry is made through graphic, not lyric channels. At this point it is worth noticing that the greater body of English literature derives its verse from acoustic sources, while its poetry, by way of contrast, is essentially graphic in type.

On the other hand, one need not look further than French or English neo-classic literature to discover the subtle artistic relation between the explicit meaning of words and the lyric element

(1) Imaginative in the sense of "image-making" or "picture-making".

in poetry. One might even describe it as a «contrapuntal» relation. When Pope wrote «The sound must seem an echo to the sense», if we understand him as indicating something more than a crude onomatopoeia, something in fact of which his own work is a constant example, we can but infer this «contrapuntal» use of the sense in poetry. That is to say, it is not just a question of vocal embroidery. Sound and sense contribute on an equal footing to an artistic effect; to an implicit meaning which does not permit of purely explicit statement (any more than the meaning of music does), though it makes use of explicit statement as a means to expression. A fair analogy is, perhaps, the joint contribution of words and music in a song. In Pope's pastoral addressed to Garth, nothing but this counterpoint of music and meaning accounts for that tenderness with which, whatever the immaturity of the poem, the words are laden; a tenderness which Handel must surely have felt when he interpreted it in terms of his own art. Yet many listeners who applaud the well-known setting of «Where'er you walk» are deaf to that music for which Handel substituted his own. Purcell, it is related, with great delicacy of implication, refrained from tendering a similar office to Dryden's «Alexander's Feast», on the grounds that the words were their own music.

It is impossible, however, to speak of the English neo-classics in terms of enthusiasm without feeling that one is prejudicing a controversial question. Just how much importance may we attach to the verse of Pope and Dryden? Dr. Johnson says: «After all this, it is surely superfluous to answer the question that has once been asked, Whether Pope was a poet? otherwise than by asking in return, If Pope be not a poet, where is poetry to be found?» Place beside this Matthew Arnold's observation: «Dryden and Pope are not classics of our poetry, they are classics of our prose.» And finally, take into consideration the modern view, which tends to replace Pope and Dryden on the pedestals from which the Romantic Revival had somewhat unceremoniously hustled them. Faced with such fluctuating estimates, a modest deference to perplexed authority may well cause us to hesitate in our attempts to assess the real merit of the writers in question. We feel, however, that this discrepancy of opinions is aggravated and the whole position obscured owing very largely to the inconsistency of the usual critical terms employed; and there seems to be some hope that armed with other and more carefully defined terms, we may with greater confidence approach a balanced view. All arguments appear to turn on what is meant by *poetry* and what is

meant by *prose*. Some critics take the line that if verse can be proved unpoetic it is proved unliterary. But Matthew Arnold treats the reputation of Pope and Dryden fairly courteously before coming to the conclusion that they are «classics of our prose». Is the conclusion meant to neutralise the courtesy, reducing it to mere irony? Or did Arnold contemplate with equanimity the prospect of dissertation in verse? Mr. T. S. Eliot expressed the view, in his essay on Dryden, that nineteenth-century prejudice had its roots in the *material* of neo-classic verse. Generally speaking, the neo-classic writers wrought their verse from the accessories of street or tavern, boudoir or drawing-room, and employed it to celebrate occasions of state or flay their political and literary enemies; while the Romantics and their successors conceived it as the poet's duty to stock his imagination with the fauna and flora of the unspoiled countryside, and held that meditation, not satire, was the natural function of serious verse.

This divergence of taste certainly accounts for a good deal of the unpopularity into which the neo-classics fell during the nineteenth century. But it is surely not the whole reason. It should be noticed that in Doctor Johnson's time the question had already been *asked*: Is Pope a poet? The Romantics were not the first to ask that question. They were the first to give it a significant negative answer. In view, then, of what seems to be a perennial doubt, a fresh investigation will not come amiss, especially when we embark on it with newly defined terms. For the two-century-old debate concerning Dryden and Pope has revolved round the use of the words *poetry* and *prose*; and it is clear that the use of those words, hitherto made by analytical critics, has been in the main compromising and confusing.

It has already been suggested that failure to appreciate the neo-classic poets arose out of a deafness to their music as much as from a prejudice against the material of their verse. But what is the origin of that failure? Even if this also is prejudice, is not prejudice sometimes confirmed by the facts? It is certainly our duty to give it a fair hearing, and even to approach it sympathetically, in order to arrive at a balanced view.

Now, considering again Matthew Arnold's remarks about Dryden and Pope, and his use of the words «poetry» and «prose» in this connection, it becomes clear that by «poetry», he, like many other English critics, often means no more than *graphic* poetry. And it is precisely our contention that certain languages have a *graphic* and others a *lyric* genius. Among the former we would place

English, German and Hebrew; among the latter, Latin Greek, and the modern Romance languages. Compare an English translation from the Hebrew with one made from the Greek; Isaiah, say, with a translation of a Greek play. How perfectly the Hebrew lends itself to the English instinct for imagery! While the Greek mannerisms seem in translation to parody themselves. Again, it is worth comparing the success of Shakespeare in German translation with the tardy recognition of his greatness in France. Arnold himself stumbled on this distinction when he wrote: "The power of French literature is in its prose-writers, the power of English literature in its poets." But his onesided view of poetry prevented him from expressing the distinction in its true terms or apprehending its exact nature.

Perhaps it is unfair to accuse the nineteenth century critics of being deaf to the music of poetry. Who could be more musical or more popular in his own time than Tennyson? But it is clear that the taste of that epoch refused to accept music in certain combinations. It cherished the lyric where it was combined with the graphic element, almost to the exclusion of explicit meaning, as, for example, in Keats' "Ode to Autumn", or in Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind". But it could not tolerate music combined with explicit meaning to the exclusion of the graphic element.

At first sight, this might seem to be a passion for "pure" poetry which would suffer the intrusion of no non-artistic element, however artistic the total result. In this case the nineteenth-century critics are not to be accused of prejudice, but credited with a consistent principle of taste. But how can this be so, when the same pens which denounced Pope and Racine as prosaic, acclaimed Dante, Virgil, and Sophocles as mighty poets? The greatest Italian, Latin, and Greek poetry boasts the same recipe as the French and English neo-classics? It subsists, that is to say, in the blending of music with explicit sense, and what pictorial power it possesses is very much in the background. How then can the typical nineteenth-century criticism escape the charge of inconsistency and prejudice? One route of escape lies open to it; and that route leads through the varying genius of different languages. Musical effects in an unmusical language, one might claim, cannot give an artistic balance over the dissertational element unless they are assisted by graphic effects. One might with reason have insisted that English, and even French, have not the same musical capacity as Italian, Latin, or Greek; though it seems hard to regard French as an unmusical language. At any rate,

it could be urged that Pope and Dryden were trying to do with the English language something that had been done with the Latin language, and that the effects to which Latin lent itself were not so naturally accommodated by English.

But there is another nineteenth-century aversion which has to be taken into consideration — the aversion to didactic verse. This brings us back to the question: Is dissertation in verse a tolerable literary form? The objection is obvious. Is not the music of verse in such works a disadvantage? Is not any kind of poetry a disadvantage, in a work of which the avowed object is explicit instruction? Poetry will surely distract us when we need to concentrate our whole attention on following the often complex ratiocinations of the writer. And if there is to be no poetry, of what use is verse? This objection, as long as it is made consistently, both against the "Essay on Criticism" and the "De Arte Poetica", against the "Essay on Man" and the "De Rerum Natura", must be squarely met.

But verse has a *useful* as well as a *fine* purpose. We should do wrong to condemn *ipso facto* a composition in which verse has a merely mnemonic value. Much of Pope's "Essay on Criticism" is pure dissertation, as Matthew Arnold would have been quick to assert, but it has a mnemonic value which is integral to the purpose of the work. If all the dissertation that Pope wrote had been written in prose, his words would not live in our mouths to-day, in a multitude of ever recurring quotations.

But apart from this it must be admitted that passages of poetry may have their place in a didactic work. They usually intervene at a climax, as a relaxation to the reader's mind. At least, such poetic passages are generally allowed in a didactic prose work, as is instanced in the Dialogues of Plato. So why should we not expect them, *a fortiori*, in a composition where the useful element of verse can be transmuted so readily into the fine art of poetry? The "De Rerum Natura" contains many such passages; and it is worth noticing in this connection how much of Shakespeare's verse is pure dissertation, or nearly so, simply explaining the bald outlines of a situation in a style incomparably more matter-of-fact than we find in his great passages of poetic prose. In fact, it was Coleridge, one of the fathers of nineteenth-century criticism, who observed that a long poem could not be all poetry. Only the confusion of terms in the word "poem" gives an air of paradox to that statement.

But to recapitulate, in view of the now almost traditional Eng-

lish aversion to a poetry which tempers its music which dissertation, may we not expect to find an opposite and corresponding aversion in the critics of other languages which derive their poetry naturally from just such a combination of elements? In the French we certainly find it. Such phrases as "Shakespeare et la violence anglaise" (1) are so commonplace as to fall almost casually from the pen of a French critic. But among ancient critics, also, we find those who attack the poetic prose-writer in terms analogous to the severity with which English critics have attacked the writer of verse dissertation. This is exactly what we should expect: that the ancient Sir Thomas Browne or Jeremy Taylor will meet a comparable fate to that of the modern Horace or Lucian. The following passage from Lucian is of interest:-

But if History is to adopt this type of flattery, what else is it but a sort of poetic prose, deprived of its lofty accents, and leaving a residue of imposture all the more patently exposed because it is stripped of metre? This is a defect of the first order, that anyone should be unable to distinguish the appurtenances of poetry from those of history, and introduce into history all the hyperbole of legend, and such ornate writing as is proper only to the faculty of poetry. It is as if one should take some robust and stalwart athlete, drape him in purple and other meretricious accessories, rub in fard, powder his face - heavens! what a fool you'd make of him by that shameful exhibition! (1)

Antiquity had its Sir Thomas Brownes. One of them — from a literary point of view at least — was St Paul. But it is doubtful

(1) G. Lanson. "Voltaire". Hachette. V. 103. The book contains other references to English poetry in similar terms, that is to say, as an affront to classic taste.

(1) ἡ ἱστορία δὲ ἦν τινα κολακείαν τοιαύτην προσλάβη, τί ἄλλο ἢ πεζὴ τις ποιητικὴ γίγνεται, τῆς μεγαλοφωνίας μὲν ἐκείνας ἐστερημένη, τὴν λοιπὴν δὲ τερατείαν γυμνὴν τῶν μέτρων καὶ δι' αὐτὸ ἐπισημοτέραν ἐκφαίνουσα; μέγα τοίνυν, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπέρμεγα τοῦτο κακόν, εἰ μὴ εἰδείη τις χωρίζειν τὰ ἱστορίας καὶ τὰ ποιητικῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπεισάγει τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τὰ τῆς ἐτέρας κομμώματα, τὸν μῦθον καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὑπερβολῶν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἀθλητὴν. τῶν καρτερῶν τούτων, καὶ κομιδῇ πρηνῶν, ἀλουργαὶ περιβάλοι, καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ κόσμῳ τῷ ἑταιρικῷ καὶ φύκιον ἐντρίβοι, καὶ ψιμύθιον τῷ προσώπῳ, Ἡράκλειος, ὡς καταγέλαστον αὐτὸν ἀπεργάσασαι αἰσχύνας τῷ κόσμῳ ἐκείνῳ.

NOTE:- Clarendon Press translators (1905) render πεζὴ τις ποιητικὴ as "poetry without the wings". This is significant. Why should such a deliberate periphrasis recommend itself to the translators, if "poetic prose" did not suggest a good connotation to an Englishman, such as πεζὴ τις ποιητικὴ obviously did not suggest to a Greek?

if Lucian, ideological considerations apart even, would have appreciated "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels". He would have asked: "What is it but poetical prose, etc.?" And his readers would not have suspected him, by that phrase, of paying a compliment. Yet the thirteenth chapter of Corinthians I is poetry, and not only poetry, but verse; poetry and verse on the Hebrew, graphic model, alien to classical antiquity.

Again, compare Lucian's scornful reflection on "poetic prose" with Arnold's pronouncement that Dryden and Pope are "classics of our prose." That is to say "classics of our dissertation." The comparison is significant. To the Greek, metre was such an important element in poetry, to the Englishman such an unimportant one. Or let us say: in Greek, a language of lyric genius, mere metre carried a work so much further toward being poetry, than it does in English, a language of graphic genius. It is also worth recalling that the term "purple patch" was coined by Horace (1) in a spirit of criticism; yet how indulgent that catchword sounds on the lips of many a modern English critic! Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, in his introduction to the Oxford Book of English Prose even makes a special plea for it. But the "purple patch" as its name proclaims, represents a graphic element, and was as unnatural in Horace's tongue as it is natural in ours.

It is our contention here that Lucian's view expresses the normal attitude of the ancient world throughout its long literary history. Phrases in Aristotle, which might seem at first sight to weaken the force of our argument, really tend to support it. For instance, we find in the "Poetics": "Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common but the metre. It is right, therefore, to call the one a poet, the other a physicist rather." And again: "The work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history; with metre, as without it." These sentences taken by themselves would seem to reflect the English rather than what we have claimed was the Greek view of poetry. But if the

(1) *Purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter
Adsuitur pannus, cum Lucus et ara Dianae
Et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros,
Aut flumen Rhenum aut pluvius describitur arcus.
Sed nunc non erat his locus.* (De Arte Poetica. 15)

Note:- Surely "purple patch" refers not to any fleeting passage of poetic writing, but specifically to *graphic* poetry. For us, vivid imagery has a natural pertinence. Our cruder syntax requires this compensation. It was not so for the ancients.

two instances are taken in their context, it will be seen that Aristotle was using the word "poetry" in a different sense from that in which it was generally used even by his contemporaries, and he admits as much. "Poetry" in his vocabulary does not refer primarily to the manipulation of language, but of subject matter. It is to be contrasted with history and science. It is what we might term "composition" as distinct from "exposition". It deals with the hypothetical rather than the actual, with what might happen rather than what has happened; or if with what has happened, simply because the actuality has interest as a hypothesis (1). This being so, his failure to reserve any term for poetry in our sense of the word, as distinct from verse, only goes to suggest that for him, as for other ancient critics, there was no great distinction. For him, as for them, the music of able versification gave to the words that lustrous quality which renders them artistic.

Yet while a consideration of ancient criticism supports the theory of linguistic tendencies that we have put forward, one has only to cite examples of New Testament poetry to forestall any attack, based on this theory, against the English neo-classics (or indeed to cut off the possible line of retreat which we recommended to their assailants). For if Pope and Dryden are accused of cultivating a foreign, Latin faculty in English, a language that can ill accommodate it, the same attack must be directed against the Hebrew idiom of New Testament Greek. We are assured, in fact, with a suspicious suggestion of epigram, that the New Testament only makes such good English because it is such bad Greek. There is a significant truth in that. St Paul wrote Hebrew poetry in Greek, yet what he wrote was none the less poetry.

With an eye, then, to this analogy, we may say that the nineteenth-century aversion to the neo-classics had its root in a sound intuition; but that intuition was rendered incoherent by the obtuse reasoning which strove to interpret it; by a failure to make the right basic distinctions; a terminological failure.

The advantage of correct and basic distinctions is that they afford a balanced view. They leave us free to incline either to the classic or the romantic school, without attributing the attitude of the other side to stark insensibility; and indeed the personality neither of Matthew Arnold nor of Samuel Johnson will allow of such a construction. Classic verse, we see, is alien to the genius of our language, and we may choose to stress this, pointing out

(1) Poetics I and IX.

the difficulties under which a writer of Pope's pretensions was labouring, by the very nature of his intractable medium. On the other hand, it is possible for a writer to triumph over his medium; and the grafting of foreign stock may bring new virility into the literature of any language. If classical antiquity had been more ready to import from the Hebrew and other exotic sources, it might not have lapsed, as it did, into centuries of sterility.

But we must always recognise the special and often delicate task of a classic poet working in a romantic language. For it is no solecism to speak of "classic and romantic" languages, if, by these terms, we mean respectively languages which naturally avail themselves of explicit statement as a means to an artistic end, and languages in which the paucity of musical content makes this method a secondary recourse, and postulates the more usual invocation of a pictorial element at the expense of the explicit. Of course, if this terminology is adopted, Romanticism cannot be retained as the opposite of Realism; though the claim of the word in this respect is equally strong. Our principle must always be: one word, one meaning. Again, complications will ensue if we try to apply the terms "Classic and Romantic" to music or the plastic arts. But in this context the words already cover a multitude of meanings, all better expressed in other terms.

Mr. T. S. Eliot finds in the distinction of Classicism and Romanticism a fundamental issue of right and wrong, each side demanding our unequivocal allegiance or dissent (1). It is refreshing in this age of flabby agnosticism to be reminded of the existence of such vital issues. But it is in no such sense that the terms are used above. The only thing that is vital, from the point of view of literary criticism — as far as we are concerned — is to realise that the distinction exists; and that its basis rests as much in a writer's language as in his taste.

J. G. WARRY

(1) "Function of Criticism". Selected Essays by T.S. Eliot. Faber p. 26.